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Abstract
This multi-study dissertation had four primary aims. My first was to add to the evidence
base indicating a positive association between free will belief (FWB) and subjective well-being
(SWB). My second aim was to develop a measure to assess the FWB theme referred to as the
principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). To achieve the first two aims, I conducted two crosssectional studies to further establish the FWB-SWB association and start the development and
assessment of a new PAP FWB measure. In the first study (N=995), I hypothesized that an EFA
of the new PAP items would produce at least a single factor structure and that FWB would be a
positive predictor of SWB. Study 1 was successful, the EFA extracted a single PAP factor with
10 items and FWB was shown to positively predict SWB. The second study (N=760) was an
exact replication of the first. Study 2 was also successful, replicating the single factor structure
for the preliminary 10-item PAP measure as well as the positive association between FWB and
SWB. Study 3 was a short-term longitudinal study providing further psychometric assessments
of PAPS-10. Study 3 found that the PAPS-10 was temporally stable and distinct for a host of
related constructs. The third aim of my project was to provide a theoretical framework for
understanding the FWB and SWB relationship. To achieve this, I developed the purpose-imbuing
model of FWB. The model posits that the primary function of FWB is to imbue people’s lives
with meaning, and by so doing establish adaptive well-being. Finally, and most importantly, the
fourth aim of my project was to experimentally test the propose-imbuing model of FWB and
determine if the FWB and SWB relationships were causal. For Study 4, I used a 3 (anti-FWB vs.
pro-FWB vs. control) X Continuous (meaning in life) between-groups experimental design to
manipulate FWB and assess its downstream effects on meaning in life and both eudainomic and
hedonic well-being. I hypothesized that a pro-FWB manipulation would result in more adaptive
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eudainomic and hedonic well-being (compared to a control) due to the manipulation bolstering
perceived meaning in life (compared to a control). I also hypothesized that an anti-FWB
manipulation would result in less adaptive eudainomic and hedonic well-being (compared to a
control) due to the manipulation diminishing perceived meaning in life (compared to a control).
All primary hypotheses of Study 4 were confirmed. The results and their implications are
discussed in detail.
Keywords: Free Will Belief, Well-Being, Worldview, Purpose/Meaning in Life
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Investigating the Potential Causal Relationship Between Free Will Belief and Well-Being
Just over 30 years ago, Christopher McCandless, “a young man from a well-to-do East
Coast family hitchhiked to Alaska and walked alone into the wilderness north of Mt. McKinley.
Four months later his decomposed body was found by a party of moose hunters” (Krakauer,
1996, p. 1). A few years earlier, McCandless, graduated from Emory University but was
radically discontent. Fueled by this discontentedness, McCandless gave his entire savings to
charity, abandoned nearly everything he owned, and set out to find a life worth living. Although
his search for a life worth living unfortunately led to his death, he ultimately succeeded in what
he set out to do. Starved, poisoned, freezing, and in full knowledge of his rapidly approaching
death, McCandless wrote his last words: "I have had a happy life and thank the Lord. Goodbye
and may God bless you all!"
The McCandless story highlights the unique human endeavor placed before all persons;
that of the good life. For centuries, humans have contemplated and strived for the good life.
Indeed, the prime goal of most of the world’s religious traditions—from the ancient wisdom of
Siddhārtha Gautama to the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth—is to direct people to the good life
and the well-being it brings. In the USA, the cultural value placed on individual well-being is
evidenced in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence by declaring that all persons have
a right to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (1776).
It is difficult for any serious student of psychology to identify a single outcome of
importance not of relevance to well-being. Indeed, the canon of psychological science is a
collection of knowledge regarding states of ill-being and well-being, methods for its study, and
recommendations for its attainment. Though indicators of psychosocial well-being (e.g., life
satisfaction) are no doubt prudential goods in and of themselves, they gain even more importance
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as significant predictors of decreased disease and mortality (Cohen et al., 2016; Rozanski et al.,
2019; Zhang & Han, 2016).
Although the subject of less empirical attention, psychological science investigating the
predictors and antecedents of well-being has also grown over the past few decades. This research
has indicated social and psychological factors such as belonging and meaning in life as important
predictors and antecedents of well-being. So fruitful was this research that both factors are
theorized as primary social and psychological needs, of which the satisfactions are nearly
universally agreed upon by scholars as necessary for one to attain adaptive levels of well-being
(Baumeister, 1991; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Diener and Seligman, 2004; Ryan and Deci,
2001; Ryff and Singer, 1998; Steger, 2009; 2012; 2017).
More recently, research has indicated the potential of one’s free will belief for predicting
their level of well-being. People who more strongly believe in free will, as opposed to those
portraying perfunctory or antagonistic beliefs on the topic, are more likely to report more
adaptive levels of well-being (Zhao & Huo, 2022). However, the evidence base for the
association between free will belief and well-being is scant and relatively atheoretical. To
remedy these, the focal aims of this multi-study research program were: 1) to add to the evidence
base indicating associations between free will belief and well-being; 2) to develop a measure of
free will belief designed to capture the free will theme known as the principle of alternative
possibilities; 3) to provide a substantive theoretical framework for understanding free will belief,
meaning in life, and well-being as a nomological network; and 4) to experimentally investigate
this newly developed theoretical framework, wherein the causal path of free will belief to
meaning in life to well-being is put to the test.
The Conceptual Landscape of Well-Being
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The science of well-being has come to differentiate between two distinct dimensions of
well-being, those of hedonic well-being and eudaimonic well-being (Boehm & Kubzansky,
2012; Hernandez et al., 2018; Ryff, 2017; Steptoe, 2019). The hedonic dimension of well-being
is that which incorporates one’s feelings of happiness and experiences of pleasure and pain. The
eudaimonic dimension of well-being is that which incorporates one’s feelings of achieving selfrealization and one’s overall sense of life satisfaction. Both well-being dimensions enjoy
significant conceptual support, with the vast majority of well-being scholars in agreement over
their conceptual legitimacy.
Well-Being, Meaning in Life, and Free Will Belief
Meaning in Life as a Predictor and Antecedent of Well-Being
Literally hundreds of studies have provided evidence that meaning in life is related to less
suffering and more well-being (Steger, 2012). Greater meaning in life is associated with greater
positive emotions, vitality, and satisfaction with life (Chamberlain & Zika, 1988; Kennedy et al.,
1994; Keyes et al., 2002; King et al., 2006; Ryff, 1989; Steger & Frazier, 2005; Steger &
Kashdan, 2006; Steger et al., 2006; 2008; 2015; Zika & Chamberlain, 1992). Also, meaning in
life has been evidenced as being positively associated with happiness and positive life
adjustment in many countries (Bonebright et al., 2000; Debats, 1996; Debats et al., 1993; Fry,
2000, 2001; Garfield, 1973; O’Conner & Vallerand, 1998; Reker, 2002; Reker et al., 1987; Ryff
& Keyes, 1995; Scannell et al., 2002; Shek, 1995; Shin et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 2003;
Wong, 1998; Zika & Chamberlain, 1987; 1992).
The Meaning of Meaning in Life
As a psychological construct, meaning or meaning in life as it is often referred, is an
umbrella term that also incorporates notions like significance and purpose in life. The conceptual
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definition that has garnered the most consensus states that meaning is “the extent to which people
comprehend, make sense of, or see significance in their lives, accompanied by the degree to
which they perceive themselves to have a purpose, mission, or overarching aim in life” (Steger,
2009, p. 682). Much of the literature describes meaning in life as a tripartite psychological
construct (George & Park, 2016; Hanson & VanderWeel, 2012; Heintzelman & King, 2014;
Hick & King, 2009; King Heintzelman, & Ward, 2016; Martela & Steger; 2016). The first
component is a cognitive that serves the primary function of making sense of one’s life. This
component is often referred to as coherence. While also cognitive, the second component is
largely an affective one that serves the primary function of imbuing value and importance into a
person’s life. This second component is often referred to as significance. Lastly, the third
component is a motivational one which serves the primary function of leading a person into the
pursual of purpose. This third component is often referred to as purpose. Given these three
components, the core concept of meaning in life is that it “captures the human capacity to make
sense of life (coherence component), to pursue purpose (purpose component) and to lead a life
that is worthwhile and important (significance component);” parenthetical notes are my own
(Steger, 2009, p. 682). It is also important to make explicit the implicit inherent temporal
differences between the three components of meaning (Steger, 2012; 2016). The temporal focus
of coherence can be on the present but is primarily focused on making sense out of a person’s
past, or their past on up to their present. The temporal focus of significance is the opposite.
While it does indeed take memories into account, significance is primarily about the value and
importance a person feels their life currently has. The temporal focus of purpose is future
oriented as it is primarily about a person’s quest to find purpose or achieve a goal that is thought
to bestow meaning in their life.
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Measuring Meaning in Life
The Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger et al., 2006) is currently the most used
psychometrically valid measure of meaning (Brandstätter et al., 2012; Heintzelman & King,
2014). The psychometric properties of the MLQ have been well validated and with large crossnational samples (e.g., Steger et al., 2008; Steger & Samman, 2012; Steger & Shin, 2010). The
MLQ assess the degree to which people perceive their lives to have meaning and the degree to
which people feel that they are searching for more meaning in their lives (Steger et al., 2008,
2011).
Free Will Belief as a Predictor and Antecedent of Meaning and Well-Being
An emerging scientific literature suggests that free will belief is an important factor for
meaning in life and a significant predictor of well-being. Correlational studies have found a
positive association between free will belief (hereafter, FWB) and meaning in life, such that,
people with stronger FWB tend to also report greater perceived meaning in their lives (Alquist,
Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013; Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilburg, 2017; 2019). Experimental
research has shown that when inducing people to disbelieve in free will they are more likely
report a greater degree of meaninglessness than people not induced to such a disbelief in free will
(Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilburg, 2019). The empirical connection between FWB and meaning in
life is rather intuitive considering the core conceptualization of meaning in life as “the human
capacity to make sense of life, to pursue purpose and to lead a life that is worthwhile and
important” (Steger, 2009, p. 682). Implicit in this conceptualization lay the notion of free choice.
For a person would need to choose to pursue something, as well as choose to act in accordance
with their idea of worthwhile and important.
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Research has also indicated a positive association between free will belief and subjective
first-person reports of well-being (hereafter, SWB). Specifically, more adaptive levels of SWB
indicators (e.g., life satisfaction) have been observed amongst people with stronger FWB (Collier
& Shi, 2020; Kondratowicz-Nowak & Zawadzka, 2018; Li et al., 2017; Li & Wong; 2020;
Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilburg; 2017). Moreover, recent longitudinal research has provided
preliminary evidence suggesting a potential causal relationship between FWB and SWB.
Specifically, a cross-lagged study design revealed that stronger FWB led to more adaptive SWB
outcomes for people, but not in the opposite direction (Zhao & Huo, 2022). This is the closest the
field has come to answering the causal question. However, a prior study using a similar design
methodology did not find this association (Gooding, Callan, & Hughes, 2018). Although it is
important to note that the study finding no such association used a single-item measure of
unknown validity and reliability to assess FWB. A weakness not shared by Zhao and Huo’s
(2022) work evidencing the potential causal path of stronger FWB leading to more adaptive
SWB outcomes. However, what exactly is free will and what do folks believe about it?
The Science of Free Will Belief: From Philosophy to Psychology
In his seminal work, Are We Automata? (1879) the founder of American psychology,
William James, argued that a rich capacity for free choice was a necessary but not sufficient
condition of leading a meaningfully ethical life. James proclaimed, “the problem of man is less
what act he shall now choose to do, than what being he shall now resolve to become” (1879,
p.13). In his usual form of sharp literary rhetoric, he draws the reader into the meaningful—now
referred to as the existential—problem of free will. For James, free will was not important for the
present moment in and of itself. Rather, free will was important for one’s ethical character
development which then imbues one’s choices in the present moment with great meaning. From
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this mindset comes another example of Jamesian free will rhetoric, “my first act of free will shall
be to believe in free will” (1884). James’ proclamations were bold ones and were by no means
any less controversial then than they would be today, given the popularity of psychodynamic
theory and its affinity for Schopenhauerian determinism (aka soft determinism, compatibilism).
The question of metaphysical human freedom, or free will, is a perennial one. Each
generation must ask this question for themselves and reflect on its ever-elusive answer. While
the fact of matter regarding the existence of free will is a metaphysical one—and therefore
beyond the reach of scientific verification—the scientific investigation of its belief and the
potential psychological affordances and consequences of such a belief are entirely proper
(Baumeister, 2008; Baer, Kaufman & Baumeister, 2008). Indeed, a cumulating body of literature
in social psychology agrees.
The Definition of Free Will in Psychological Science
Belief in free will is often assumed within the wider body of literature to be synonymous
with personal control beliefs such as locus of control and the phenomenological sense of agency
in day-to-day experience. To be clear, the belief in free will is indeed associated with locus of
control and agency (Abbott, 2017). However, empirical evidence has shown these associations to
be too weak to argue the constructs as redundant (Paulus & Carry, 2011; Carry & Paulus, 2014).
The common confusion of the belief in free will with other facets of personal control beliefs
familiar to psychology exemplifies the importance of providing clear definitions of the range of
free will beliefs.
While the specific definition of free will differs between distinct philosophical schools of
thought, it is near universally agreed upon that free will is to be thought of as a metaphysical
phenomenon applying to all persons endowed with reasonable cognitive faculties (James,
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1899/2014; Van Inwagen, 1975, Dennett, 1984, Kane, 1998, Baumeister, 2008). The
psychological definition of free will that is used in the present research is provided by an
interdisciplinary group of researchers who define the construct as the capacity for free action
(Haggard, Mele, O’Connor, & Vohs, 2010). However, what does it mean for an action to be
free? Bringing more conceptual clarity to this definition, Baumeister and Monroe (2014) further
distinguish free action with two pertinent themes: (1) the possibility of multiple courses of action
stemming from the same present, and (2) an intentional action based on informed, rational
deliberation by an agent who is not externally coerced to make a particular choice. The first
theme has been referred to as the principle of alternative possibilities (hereafter, PAP), as well as
the ability-to-do-otherwise (Van Inwagen, 1983; Kane, 1998). The second theme has been
referred to as volition (Dennett, 1984; Sartorio, 2015). Therefore, any psychological study of
FWB must assess people’s beliefs and/or perceptions regarding one or both aspects of free will
belief (i.e., PAP and/or volition).
How is FWB different than locus of control? A key difference between FWB and LOC
can be found in the subject matter of the constructs themselves (i.e., their aboutness).
Specifically, locus of control (hereafter, LOC) is a psychological construct for which the primary
subject (i.e., the aboutness) directly refers to the self. LOC refers to the degree to which a person
feels outcomes in their life are contingent upon their own behavioral control vs. randomness
and/or the control of powerful others (Rotter 1966; Levenson, 1972). LOC is therefore primarily
about and directly in reference to one’s self-concept. This is contrasted by one’s belief in the
metaphysical phenomenon of free will. A belief for which the primary subject is the nature of
reality, not the self. Just as theism and atheism are beliefs about the nature of reality rather than
the self, so too is that the case for FWB.
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To be clear, this work takes no interest whatsoever in which FWB theme (i.e., volition vs
PAP) is most crucial for the existence or nonexistence of a freedom permitting universe nor
humans’ ability to acquire whichever freedom should it exist. To argue the goings-on of these
themes as they related to reality (i.e., their truth value) is the province of philosophers. And
rightly so. This work neither cares about the ontological status of free will (i.e., its truth value)
nor its compatibility or incompatibility with a deterministic universe. Another metaphysical
question for which this work is also agnostic.
For the remainder of this work, PAP will be the preferred term for referring to the notion
of free will (i.e., rather than the ability-to-do-otherwise). Although both terms refer to the same
notion of free will, the ability-to-do-otherwise is mostly used within the philosophical literature;
often whilst referring to the nature of its truth value. Though used less within the psychological
literature, when the term for this notion of free will belief is discussed, it is more likely to be
referred to by PAP. This work seeks to remain consistent with this sensible established norm.
The Psychometrics of Free Will Belief
Several measures of FWB have been developed. However, most of these measures are illconceived, attempting to assess FWB with items that have too much overlap with related yet
distinct constructs, such as locus of control and one’s subjective sense of agency. As previously
discussed, two core themes of FWB are the belief in PAP and the belief in volition. Therefore,
any measure of FWB must be able to assess people’s beliefs regarding one or both FWB themes.
However, only the volition FWB theme is measurable as a measure for the PAP theme of FWB
has yet to be developed.
The Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD-Plus). The most widely used FWB
measure is by far the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). This FWB instrument was developed

19

to assess lay beliefs of free will rather than the beliefs regarding the complex philosophical
distinctions of free will. The measure has been described as capturing a simplified-lay version of
the FWB theme known as volition Baumeister & Monroe, 2014; Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong,
2014; Paulhus & Carey, 2011). The construct validity of the measure has been assessed and
challenged several times (the FAD-Plus is the fourth iteration of the measure). While the free
will subscale portion of the measure was published containing 7 items, researchers objected to 3
items in the measure that are, on face, conflated moral responsibility with FWB. It is now
common, indeed recommended, to use the free will subscale of the FAD-Plus in a paired down
4-item form that excludes the moral responsibility items (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). In its current
form and use, the FAD-Plus enjoys satisfactory levels of construct validity and reliability (both
test-retest and internal; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014; Paulhus & Carey, 2011).
What About Measuring PAP? While the FAD-Plus gives researchers the ability to assess
the volition theme of FWB, the other key FWB theme known as PAP remains untapped. The
lack of a valid and reliable measure of the PAP theme of FWB serves to be a large gap in the
science of FWB in two crucial ways. First, the assessment of FWB, if the status quo persists, will
always be one that is error inflated. Specifically, if key themes of any psychological construct are
left out of the primary assessment tools of those constructs, said assessment tools are then known
to be error inflated. Second, the science of FWB has a methodological flaw that can always be
used as a reason for not finding or replicating hypotheses.
Experimental Manipulations of Free Will Belief
Two FWB manipulations have been used to experimentally assess the consequences of
FWB. In the first method (Vohs & Schooler, 2008) participants are randomly assigned to read
one of two passages from Francis Crick’s famous book, the Astonishing Hypothesis (1994). In
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an anti-FWB condition, participants read a passage arguing that the reality of free will as
impossible given scientific knowledge. In a neutral/control condition, participants read a passage
from the same book that makes no mention of free will. The second FWB manipulation method
(Vohs & Schooler, 2008) used a Velten-like technique (Velten, 1968), wherein participants are
instructed to read, reflect upon, and then rephrase a set of statements that either support or
oppose the concept of free will. Other researchers (e.g., Alquist et al., 2013; 2014; Baumeister et
al., 2009) then added a control condition to the Velten-like technique, wherein participants read,
ponder, and then rephrase a set of statements about nature. In its complete form (i.e., pro-FWB,
anti-FWB, and control conditions) the Velten-like FWB manipulation technique randomly
assigns participants to experience either the pro-FWB, the anti-FWB, or the control condition.
People in the pro-FWB condition read, reflect upon, and then rephrase statements such as, “I am
able to override the genetic and environmental factors that sometimes influence my behavior”
and “Avoiding temptation requires that I exert my free will.” People in the anti-FWB condition
read, reflect upon, and then rephrase statements such as, “Science has demonstrated that free will
is an illusion” and “Everything a person does is a direct consequence of their environment and
genetic makeup.” Lastly, people in the control condition read, reflect upon, and then rephrase
statements such as, “Monarch butterflies fly slowly but have been sighted hundreds of miles at
sea” and “Half a day’s boat ride away from Athens lies the isle of Mykonos.”
The construct validity of Velten-like FWB manipulation technique has been inferred
through qualitative and quantitative assessments. Initial validation studies using exit interviews
indicated that participant FWB was sufficiently augmented in the intended directions of the
manipulation conditions (Baumeister, Mele, & Vohs, 2010; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Initial
validation studies also used a pseudo known-groups paradigm showing that FAD-Plus scores
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were significantly predicted by the FWB manipulation groups and in the intended direction
(Baumeister et al., 2009; Baumeister, Mele, & Vohs, 2010; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). With higher
FAD-Plus scores found for the participants in the pro-FWB condition compared to the other
conditions, and lower FAD-Plus scores found for the participants in the anti-FWB condition
compared to the others. The FAD-Plus is now often used as a manipulation check in studies
manipulating FWB (Genschow et al., 2021; Schooler, Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, & Vohs, 2014).
Nearly 150 experimental studies (Genschow et al., 2021) have implemented the Velten-like
FWB manipulation technique, to investigate the interpersonal and social-cognitive consequences
of FWB.
The Social Cognition of Free Will Belief
FWB has been shown to have important effects on a variety of social-cognitive outcomes.
Most studies have revealed negative effects for the denial of free will and positive or even
prosocial effects for its acceptance. Specifically, FWB has been shown to increase gratitude and
forgiveness towards study confederates, increases in helping behaviors within quasiexperimental good-Samaritan paradigms, increased volunteerism for prosocial causes, and
increased levels of self-control (MacKenzie, Vohs & Baumeister, 2014; Nahmias, 2007;
Baumeister, Masicampo & DeWall, 2009; Baumeister, Sparks, Stillman & Vohs, 2008).
Moreover, studies that have induced a disbelief in free will condition have shown that its denial
increases aggression, scholastic cheating behaviors, and significant reductions in the prosocial
effects mentioned above (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009).
However, not all the evidence shows prosocial effects. Studies by Pronin and Kugler (2010)
provide evidence of a self-serving free will bias, such that, people tend to see themselves as
possessing greater amounts of free will than others; this finding gives one pause when
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considering the evidence regarding moral and legal judgments. Clark and colleagues (2014)
found that high free will believers are more likely to judge the moral failings of others harshly
and more likely to advocate for stricter sentencing of criminal misdemeanors. Other research is
complementary to this, find that a mechanistic (i.e., less agentic) view of the world reduces
punishment and retribution motives (Shariff et al., 2014).
A large scale meta-analytic project (Genschow et al., 2021) aimed at replicating much of
the social-cognitive effects of FWB discussed above has largely resulted in contradictory or
vague findings. Specifically, the suggestion that FWB leads to pro-social behavior (or the antifree will belief leads to less pro-social behavior) did not replicate in the majority of the studies.
The same failure to replicate across several studies was also found for the work suggesting that
FWB leads to retributive justice and increases to punishment severity and duration. However,
while this meta-analytic work was not able to replicate the outcomes previously demonstrated for
FWB, it did provide a robust demonstration of the reliability Velten-like FWB manipulation
technique. Specifically, in nearly all 145 experimental studies that were included in this metaanalysis, the Velten-like FWB manipulation led to reliable differences in FAD-Plus scores with
effects sizes ranging between the smaller to larger ends of medium effects (Genschow et al.,
2021).
Theoretical Framework for the Free Will Belief and Well-Being Relation
Although psychological research in the interpersonal effects of FWB saw increased
attention in the past few decades, a dearth of research exists regarding the intrapersonal effects
of free will beliefs. Does FWB offer its adherents psychological benefits or harms? Past research
suggests that people with greater internal locus of control, sense of agency, and autonomy are
also likely to have greater self-esteem, self-efficacy, and adaptive self-concepts. All of which
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have been associated with positive SWB outcomes (Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilburg, 2017;
Yanchar, 2017; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Lyubomirsky, Tkach, & DiMatteo, 2006; Caplan &
Schooler, 2003). Might the same also be true of FWB?
As previously discussed, a small program of research has indicated just that, reporting
positive associations between FWB and SWB. Specifically, people with stronger FWB have
been found to also have more adaptive levels of SWB (Collier & Shi, 2020; KondratowiczNowak & Zawadzka, 2018; Li et al., 2017; Li & Wong; 2020; Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilburg;
2017). Also, recent longitudinal research has provided preliminary evidence suggesting a
potential causal relationship between FWB and SWB using a cross-lagged design methodology
(Zhao & Huo, 2022). However, another study using a similar cross-lagged methodology found
no effect (Gooding, Callan, & Hughes, 2018). It is clear that replication and more rigorous
assessments of the FWB to SWB causal pathway are needed.
Another primary weakness of the current state of the FWB on SWB research program is
its lack of meaningful theoretical grounding. This research seeks to remedy this fact by first
drawing on the evolutionary psychology of FWB (suggesting that FWB is likely of some
psychologically adaptive fitness) and then positing a worldview-conflict model of FWB.
Evolutionary Accounts of Free Will Belief
Free Will Belief as an Evolutionary Byproduct. One evolutionary perspective of human
free will dually posits 1) the existence of free will as a legitimate human capacity, and 2) rather
than being directly selected for, the human capacity for free will is merely an emergent property
of more fundamental capacities that were directly selected for. From this perspective, the
veridical first-person experience of free will is cumulative result of capacities such as selfconsciousness, attention, mental time travel, and self-control (Grinde, 2022). Regarding the
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ontological legitimacy of human free will, Grinde (2022) proposes that the first-person
experience of free will approximately comports with reality, after accounting for the particulars
of person-situation interactions. While this theory may provide an explanation for how legitimate
human free will may have emerged, the usefulness of this theory for empirical research is unclear
at best. The two primary claims of the theory are seemingly unfalsifiable, as the truth value of
free will’s existence is a question for metaphysics, and the ability to observe the evolution of
capacities such as self-consciousness would (at the very least) require a time-machine.
Cheekiness aside, the evolutionary byproduct account of free will seemingly has zero utility for
generating hypotheses about FWB and its adaptive functions.
The Cultural-Animal Framework of Free Will Belief. As posited by Baumeister (2008),
human evolution selected for a new (in the purview of evolutionary history) and more complex
form of action control marked by self-control and rational choice. Moreover, these newly
evolved capacities (i.e., self-control and rational choice) psychologically correspond to FWB and
are also highly adaptive, especially for functioning within culture. This theory, while general and
nonspecific, offers a simple and coherent claim—FWB exists because it is socially and
psychologically adaptive. From the perspective of the cultural-animal model, FWB serves to
bolster perceptions of behavioral control and agency, as well as engaging in future-mindedness
planning, and self-control (Baumeister, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009). Clearly, this model is
useful for generating testable hypotheses regarding the adaptive functions—either interpersonal
or intrapersonal—of FWB.
Conceptualizing a Purpose-Imbuing Model of FWB on SWB
The theoretical model of FWB formulated here is the result of synthesizing the ideas of
key philosophers from the turn of the century (Camus, 1942; Heidegger, 1927; Sartre, 1943,
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1946) to modern day (Pereboom, 2014; Smith, 2005) with the empirical data from the science of
FWB and meaning in life. There are two core premises of this model: 1) the primary
intrapersonal function of FWB is to imbue a person’s life with meaning, and 2) the adaptive
function of FWB is wholly due the meaning afforded by FWB. Furthermore, purpose-imbuing
model FWB is consistent with the cultural-animal framework of FWB and explicitly formulated
to expound upon the cultural-animal framework of FWB. Such that, the purpose-imbuing model
posits the existence of two distinct primary routes for the adaptive benefits of FWB. The first
route is explained by Baumeister’s (2008) cultural-animal framework. This route is the direct
route for FWB and positive psychosocial adaptivity. The second route is explained by the
purpose-imbuing model of FWB formulated here and is the indirect route for FWB and positive
psychosocial adaptivity. Therefore, while the purpose-imbuing model assumes the truth of the
cultural-animal framework, but there is no need to assume the reverse. Specifically, the culturalanimal framework is acknowledged here as independent of the purpose-imbuing model, whereas
the purpose-imbuing model is conceptualized as being an addition to the cultural-animal
framework.
Why, however, posit such a purpose-imbuing model of FWB? In my view, such a model
makes the most sense of the influential existential works of Heidegger (1927), Camus (1942),
and Sartre (1943, 1946), the modern and analytical works of Smith (2005) and Pereboom (2014),
as well as the relevant empirical psychological data. Specifically, meaning in life has been found
to be related to greater self-control, responsibility autonomy, mastery, and internal LOC (Debats
et al., 1993; Newcomb & Harlow, 1986; Reid, 1996; Ryff, 1989; Ryff, 1989; Shek, 2001; Steger
et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 2003). All of these are also some of the primary correlates of FWB.
Also, greater meaning in life has also been linked to more optimistic orientations toward the
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future (Martela, Ryan, Steger, 2017; Mascaro & Rosen, 2005; 2006; Mascaro et al., 2004; Steger
& Frazier, 2005; Steger, 2006; Thompson & Pitts, 1993). This is especially noteworthy, as a key
aspect of the PAP theme of FWB is also future oriented. Namely the PAP belief in multiple
possible futures and courses of action (Baumeister & Monroe, 2016). More importantly, FWB
has been directly linked to both meaning in life and SWB. Recent research has found greater
perceived meaning in life, as well as more adaptive SWB for among people with stronger, as
opposed to weaker, FWB (Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013; Moynihan, Igou, & van
Tilburg, 2017; 2019). Also, experimentally inducing people to disbelieve in free will led to
increased perceptions of life as meaningless compared to a control group, indicating a causal
relationship (Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilburg, 2019). Furthermore, longitudinal research has
provided some evidence of a potential causal relationship between FWB and SWB. Because
cross-lagged models have supported the FWB to SWB pathway, but not the SWB to FWB
pathway (Zhao & Huo, 2022). I propose that the purpose-imbuing model of FWB
parsimoniously explains such findings and also provides specific claims that are falsifiable.
Predictions of the Purpose-Imbuing Model of FWB. The purpose-imbuing model of
FWB claims that the primary intrapersonal function of FWB is to imbue life with meaning and
that the adaptive function of FWB is due to the meaning afforded by FWB. The model is
therefore inherently mediational. Specifically, in its positive formulation, the model would
predict that stronger FWB leads to increased meaning in life and that increased meaning in life
then leads to more adaptive SWB. In its negative formulation, the model would predict that
weaker FWB leads to decreased meaning in life and that decreased meaning in life then leads to
less adaptive SWB. This model (see Figure 1, page 92) lends itself to several methodological
approaches, but in my view the model may be best tested by both experimental between-groups
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designs and longitudinal within-subjects designs. While the formulation and evaluation of the
purpose-imbuing model of FWB is central to the aims the present research program, the
worldview-conflict model could provide an explanatory challenge to the purpose-imbuing model
of FWB. Therefore, the worldview-conflict model and its potential challenge will now be
discussed.
The Worldview-Conflict Model of FWB. The worldview conflict model of FWB applies
knowledge from the literature of the psychological and behavioral consequences of worldview
threat to the role of FWB. When in the face of worldview conflict/ threat, people feel a surge of
negative emotions, experience decreased SWB (including increased negative emotion, perceived
stress, and anxiety) and express more prejudicial attitudes to worldview-conflicting people and
information as a result of the aversive experience of worldview threat (Brandt et al., 2014;
Byrne, 1969; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012; Simons & Green, 2018). As FWB is a
worldview level belief, it is posited that the aversion to worldview-conflicting information (such
as the potential threat of a falsified FWB) applies to the worldview level belief of FWB.
Therefore, through the lens of this model, perceived conflicts/ threats to FWB should result in
reduced SWB, as is the case for other threatened worldviews. Such is the worldview-conflict
model of FWB.
The Purpose-Imbuing vs. Worldview-Conflict Accounts of FWB. An important
characteristic of the purpose-imbuing model of FWB is its limited scope. The model makes no
grander claims than what was state above. The worldview-conflict model is much larger in
scope, as it was formulated to explain the theoretically causal connection of worldview level
beliefs and subjective well-being (Brandt, Crawford, & Van Tongeren, 2019; Greenberg,
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). The worldview-
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conflict model contains two key postulates: 1) stimuli/information threatening to one’s
worldview results in negative affect (e.g., the state of worldview-conflict), and 2) this aversive
state reduces well-being and produces a strong desire for regaining faith in one’s worldview.
When applied to FWB, the worldview-conflict model states that stimuli/information threatening
to one’s FWB results in negative affect which reduces SWB. Tension between the models arises
when the methodology of an experiment includes the manipulation of FWB (a worldview level
construct) and its potential effect on SWB (see Figure 1.2, page 92).
When applied to the experimental manipulation of FWB and its downstream effects on
SWB, the models make key predictions that are at odds with each other. The purpose-imbuing
model states that FWB leads to adaptive well-being by way of increased levels of meaning in
life. Applying the purpose-imbuing model to an experimental framework, wherein FWB is
manipulated, would lead to the following predictions: First, an anti-FWB manipulation would,
relative to a neutral condition, lead to decreased meaning in life which in turn would lead to
decreased SWB. Second, a pro-FWB manipulation, relative to a neutral condition, would lead to
increased meaning in life, which in turn would lead to increased SWB.
This is contrasted by the worldview-conflict model which states salient FWB threats
result in a cascade of negative emotions leading to decreased SWB. Applying this model to the
same between-groups experimental methodology would lead to the following predictions: First,
an anti-FWB manipulation would lead to increased negative affect (compared to a control
group), which would then lead to decreased SWB (compared to a control group). Second, a proFWB manipulation would result in no changes to negative affect or SWB. Why such a prediction
for the pro-FWB manipulation? This prediction is stated as such because a majority of the laity
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report at least a mildly affirming view of human free will (Baumeister & Monroe, 2016; Paulhus
& Carey, 2011), hence no threat could occur.
The tension between the models is found in their predictions for the anti-FWB
manipulation. In the case that only the first prediction of the purpose-imbuing model is
supported, further adjudication between the models would be needed. Specifically, if the only
effect found was the one predicted for the anti-FWB manipulation, whereby an anti-FWB
manipulation led to decreased meaning in life (relative to a neutral condition) which in turn led
to decreased SWB (again, relative to a neutral condition), one could reasonably claim that the
purpose-imbuing model is an inferior explanation of the data than the worldview-conflict model.
Ambiguity would then be the ultimate result as either model could explain the data, hence the
need for further adjudication. If this effect predicted for the anti-FWB manipulation by the
purpose-imbuing model can be shown in the face of controlling for negative affect (i.e., the
mediating variable from the worldview-threat model), then that would provide evidence in favor
of the purpose-imbuing model of FWB. I propose that this hypothesis is key to defending against
the problem of ambiguity and competing hypotheses. See Figure 1.3 on page 93 for a conceptual
depiction of the model predictions.
The Current Multi-Study Research Program
The present multi-study project has three overarching aims. The first is to add to the
evidence base indicating positive associations between FWB and SWB. Secondly, this work
seeks to replicate the more commonly evidenced positive association between FWB and SWB
(rather than the lesser indicated no association), thereby providing increased clarity to the
evidence base. Thirdly, to provide a substantive theoretical framework for understanding the
FWB and SWB connection. A worldview-conflict model of FWB—whereby perceived conflicts/
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threats to FWB are theorized to result in reduced SWB—is offered to achieve the third
overarching aim of this program of research.
Also, in service of the second overarching aim of the present research program is the goal
of developing and validating a new FWB measure designed to assess people’s belief of the FWB
theme known as PAP. Currently, there is no validated measure of the perennial and potentially
psychologically important PAP theme of FWB. This research sought to change that. Study 1
reports the item development process and factor structure of the new PAP measure of FWB, as
well as results of a structural equation model assessing the relationship between FWB and SWB.
Study 2 is a full replication and extension of Study 1. It reports a replication of the new PAP
measure’s factor structure, as well as a replication of the FWB and SWB structural equation
model (hereafter, SEM).
Study 3 was conducted to, once again, confirm the factor structure of the new PAP
measure of FWB and provide more robust assessments of the new PAP measure’s reliability and
validity. Lastly, Study 4 was a theoretically informed experimental research design that was
conducted to assess whether the FWB and SWB relationship is a causal one.
Overview of Study 1
The primary objective of Study 1 was the development of a new PAP measure of FWB
and to assess the relationship between the FWB and SWB. In service of the first objective the
present study, 27 positive-trait items were created to capture the PAP theme of FWB. PAP has
yet to be a construct of serious focus among FWB researchers applying the relevant
psychometric devices. This research considers the PAP theme of FWB to be a potentially
valuable psychological construct in advancing the science and discourse of FWB.
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In service of the other primary focus of this research—assessing the FWB-SWB
relationship—several overarching hypotheses informed by the literature were formulated and
tested. I hypothesized that greater FWB would predict more adaptive SWB. An online crosssectional survey method was implemented to assess the following six hypotheses:
H1: The collection of new PAP items will result in at least one PAP factor.
H2: The depression, anxiety, and life satisfaction measures will load onto one latent
subjective well-being construct.
H3: The new PAP factor(s) and a commonly used measure of volitional FWB (i.e., FADPlus) will load onto one latent FWB construct.
H4: The latent FWB variable will have a direct and positive relationship with the latent
SWB variable.
H5: Locus of control will have a direct and positive relationship with both the latent FWB
and SWB variables.
H6: The FWB and SWB relationship will remain significant after accounting for the
predicted relationships for locus of control.
Study 1: Method
Participants
Survey respondents were undergraduate college students from the greater Richmond,
Virginia (VA) area. A total of 1258 people, ranging from 18 to 55 years of age (M = 19.79)
completed the survey. Respondents were mostly women (69%) and mostly White/Caucasian but
reasonably diverse (44%, 23% Black/African American, 14% Asian, 11% Latinx, 8% other).
Each person that participated in the study received credits towards a required class participation
policy.
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Materials and Procedure
The survey was implemented online through SONA Systems, a cloud-based research
participant pool, which allows participant recruitment and online survey. After reading a short
description of the original study’s purpose, each person who chose to take part in the study was
presented with an online consenting procedure. Once the participants consented to the study,
they were presented with several measures aimed at assessing their FWB and related constructs
as well as their self-reported psychological health and well-being.
Measures
Subjective Well-Being
Depression Symptomatology. The Patient Depression Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Spitzer,
Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2001) was assessed to measure the normative (i.e., non-clinical)
levels of depressive symptomatology of participants. The measure has been widely used and has
a been shown to have a high degree of internal reliability (α = .87). Participants rated how often
they felt bothered (over the last two weeks) by depressive symptomology across 9 items on a 4point scale (1 = Not at all, 4 = Nearly every day). All 9 item/symptoms were responded to under
the context of the prompt, “Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by the
following problems?” The item/symptoms are exemplified by the following: “little interest or
pleasure in doing things;” and “feeling down, depressed, or hopeless.” The mean of all 9
item/symptoms was generated for each participant such that higher scores indicated greater
levels of patient depression (present study, α = .90, ω = .90).
Anxiety Symptomatology. The Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item (GAD-7; Spitzer,
Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006) scale was assessed to measure the normative (i.e., nonclinical) levels of anxiety symptomatology of participants. This measure of anxiety has been
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widely used and has a been shown to have a high degree of internal reliability (α = .89).
Participants rated how often they felt bothered (over the last two weeks) by anxiety
symptomology across 7 items on a 4-point scale (1 = Not at all, 4 = Nearly every day). All 9
item/symptoms were responded to under the context of the prompt, “Over the last 2 weeks, how
often have you been bothered by the following problems?” The item/symptoms are exemplified
by the following: “feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge;” and “not being able to stop or control
worrying.” The mean of all 7 items/symptoms was then generated for each participant such that
higher scores indicated greater levels of participant anxiety (present study, α = .89, ω = .89).
Life Satisfaction. The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, &
Griffin, 1985; Pavot, & Diener, 2008) was used to assess the degree to which participants felt
their satisfied with the course and current state of their lives. This five item Likert type measure
has been widely used as an indicator of well-being, has been shown to have good internal
reliability (α = .87), and is exemplified by the following: “In most ways my life is close to my
ideal;” and “so far I have gotten the important things I want in life.” The SWLS was
implemented using a 6-point scale in the present study (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly
agree). The mean of all 5 items was then generated for each participant such that higher scores
indicated greater levels of participant life satisfaction (present study, α = .90, ω = .90).
Free Will Belief
Volition Theme of FWB. Four items from the free will subscale of the Free Will and
Determinism Scale (FAD-Plus; Paulhus & Carey, 2011) were used to measure participant levels
of FWB. Participants rated their level of agreement to each item on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 6 = strongly agree), and is exemplified by the following items: “people have complete
control over the decisions they make;” and “strength of mind can always overcome the body's
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desires.” The measure was mean scored for each participant, with higher scores indicating
greater participant belief in free will. This measure has been documented as having an acceptable
level of internal reliability (α = .75, ω = .75; present study).
Initial Item Pool for PAP Them of FWB. A collection of 27 items aimed at capturing the
PAP notion of FWB were created. See Table 1.1 on page 102 for a complete list. Items were
constructed to tap into PAP motifs identified in the literature. Examples include multiple paths
into the future, counterfactuals of freedom, the will-do-an-action vs. must-do-an-action
distinction, refraining from action, and responsibility. The multiple future paths motif is
exemplified by the items “People can choose to make a real difference because the future is not
set in stone,” and “There are different futures that people can bring about through free choice.”
The counterfactuals of freedom motif can be exemplified by items such as, “People could have
made different decisions than the ones they actually made,” and “People could have chosen a
different path that would have led to a different present.” The will-do-an-action vs. must-do-anaction distinction is exemplified by, “Just because someone will do a certain thing does not
mean that they must do it,” and “Just because a person did a certain action does not mean that
they had to do it.” The refraining from action motif is exemplified by, “People can choose to say
no to their own wants and desires,” and “People could always decide to refrain from a given
action.” Lastly, the motif of responsibility is exemplified by the items, “The ability to have done
otherwise is needed for responsibility,” and “A person can only be held accountable for an
action if they were able to do otherwise.”
Face and Content Validity of PAP Item Pool. Two philosophers with expertise on the
topic of free will looked over the item pool to provide feedback regarding face validity and
content validity. Four items were identified as either problems or potential problems for face
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validity and content validity. Notably, both experts independently identified the same 4 problem
items. All 4 of these items were those aimed at the PAP motif of responsibility. The experts
indicated the following two items as problems: 1) Item 26 (i.e., “Human responsibility requires
free choice”) was too vague; 2) Item 27 (i.e., “Every person can do good or bad—it's simply up
to them”) more accurately tapped the sourcehood notion of FWB than PAP. The experts also
indicated that regardless of the previously stated problem (i.e., face invalid), all four items gave
them pause simply because of the responsibility theme itself. This theme was viewed as having
too much potential for, as one expert put it, “luring folks into agreeing with the ability-to-dootherwise due to some desire to hold others accountable.” The other expert harkened the same,
“What do you want to measure? People’s views of PAP or their views of responsibility and
accountability?” the remaining two problem items were items 24 and 25 (i.e., “The ability to
have done otherwise is needed for responsibility,” and “A person can only be held accountable
for an action if they were able to do otherwise;” respectively). As the goal was to produce an
accurate (as opposed to diverse) measure of PAP FWB, the responsibility motif items were
dropped which resulted in an Item pool of 23.
Locus of Control
A brief measure of Locus of Control (Lumpkin, 1988) was used to assess participants
perceived personal control over their lives. This was done to control for the know effects of
personal control on subjective well-being when assess the FWB-subjective well-being
relationship. This three item Likert scale has been shown to have good internal reliability (α =
.87) and is exemplified by the following: “when I make plans, I am almost certain to make them
work;” and “when I get what I want, it is usually because I worked hard for it.” This brief
internal locus of control measure was implemented using a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6
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= strongly agree). The mean of all 3 items was generated for each participant, with higher scores
indicating greater participant levels of perceived personal control (present study, α = .86, ω =
.86).
Attention Checks
Inattentive responding is a threat to surveys, especially online surveys. A participant is an
inattentive responder when they answer survey questions with a disregard for the particular
content of the items (Berry et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2015). Inattentive responders can take a
random approach to responding (i.e., random selection of response options) or a non-random
approach to responding (i.e., systematic selection of the same response option). This can produce
response patterns that may look like acquiescence, extreme responding, or fence siting (Berry et
al., 2016; Huang et al., 2015), but are in fact mere inattentiveness. Two different items aimed at
assessing participant inattentiveness were used. These items were: “Please choose ‘strongly
disagree’ for this item” and “Please choose ‘strongly agree’ for this item” (see Marjanovic,
Struthers, Cribbie, & Greenglass, 2014). Both items were used twice throughout the survey and
at random. Responses other than “strongly disagree” (i.e., for the question “Please choose
‘strongly disagree’ for this item”) and “strongly agree” (i.e., for the question “Please choose
‘strongly agree’ for this item”) were classified as random responses and assumed to indicate
participant inattentiveness. The present research used a conservative standard, participants
needed to pass all four of these questions to be included in analyses.
Data Analyses
The data was screened for inattentive respondents and 263 (21%) were classified as
inattentive and therefore excluded from analyses. While this is a relatively higher proportion of
inattentiveness it is still within the expected range (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014). The final sample
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(N = 995), for which the following analyses are based, remained demographically equivalent to
the initial sample. Participants were 18 to 55 years of age (M = 19.79, SD = 2.94), largely made
up of White women (69%) and mostly White/Caucasian (44%, 23% Black/African American,
14% Asian, 11% Latinx, 8% other).
Factor Analytic Approach for PAP Item Pool
While the 23 pro-trait items were created to capture people’s PAP FWB, there was no
reasonably plausible factor structure hypothesized a priori. As a result of the absence of any
plausible a priori factor structure, the chosen factor analytic approach was exploratory factor
analysis (hereafter, EFA). However, the process of conducting an EFA enjoys little consensus
and is replete with dilemmic opportunities that often pit theory and pragmatics against the
observed. This fact is encountered quickly. As Lee and Ashton soberly stated, “The question of
how many factors to extract involves a tradeoff between parsimony and completeness” (2007; p.
431). Due to the plethora of strategies that one can take when conducting an EFA (Lee &
Ashton, 2007; Meyers et al., 2017), a relatively algorithmic decision process was established
prior to EFA to serve as a guide for factor analyzing the data.
This EFA decision process was the result of a thorough reading of the literature on factor
analytic methodology and was intended to enable more systematic decisions to questions such
as: How many factors should be extracted and with what extraction method? If a multi-factor
model is produced, how should the factors be rotated to achieve simple structure? How to choose
between competing models when several claim to achieve simple structure? What is a
satisfactory loading? Should all items with satisfactory loadings be kept? How to go about item
reduction?
Determining the Number of Factors to Extract
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Kaiser Rule and Parallel Analysis. The Kaiser rule directs the number of factors to be
extracted from the data to be equal to the number of eigenvalues in the data greater than 1
(Kaiser, 1960; Cliff, 1988). However, while this is the most common method of determining the
number of factors to extract (Meyers et al., 2017), it has been widely criticized for its tendency to
over-extract factors (Lee & Ashton, 2007; Meyers et al., 2017). Parallel analysis (Glorfeld, 1995;
Horn, 1965; Zwick & Velicer, 1986) was introduced as a solution to the over-extraction problem
of the Kaiser rule. Parallel analysis is a Monti Carlo data simulation technique that randomly
produces eigenvalues based around the parameters of a given dataset. The number of eigenvalues
in the actual data that are greater than their corresponding eigenvalues from the simulated dataset
is taken to indicate the number of factors that should be extracted (Lee & Ashton, 2007). When
the eigenvalues of the simulated dataset become greater than (i.e., crossover) the corresponding
eigenvalues of the actual dataset, said crossover point is taken as the cutoff point for the number
of factors to be extracted (Lee & Ashton, 2007).
The Goldberg Method. The EFA decision process established for this work was informed
by the Kaiser rule and parallel analysis, as well as the factor analytic approach advocated by
Goldberg (2006). For this approach, many EFAs of varying factor structures are assessed and
compared. The final solution is then chosen by singling out the factor structure that is the most
parsimonious while also enjoying as much theoretical utility as possible (Goldberg, 2006). While
this method is one that many support (Lee & Ashton, 2007; Meyers et al., 2017), especially in
the case of scale development, the starting point is undefined. Does one start with the Kaiser rule
or something else? Moreover, does one move up or down in the number of factors for the
multiple EFA comparisons? In the face of such ambiguity this method has been criticized for its
potential to introduce bias into the process of determining optimal factor solutions (Revelle &
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Wilt, 2013; Sellbom, & Tellegen, 2019). Nevertheless, the strength of this method is not lost
here. That is, to determine the optimal factor solution whilst in the presence of theory (Lee &
Ashton, 2007).
The Present EFA Decision Process. The EFA decision process for this work was
multifaceted. It was anticipated that several EFAs may need to be conducted to find the optimal
factor solution. Motivated by that possibility, the EFA decision process used here first set out to
establish a means to restrict the potential number of EFAs to result in a more conservative
Goldberg inspired approach. This was achieved by reframing the Kaiser rule as an upper limit on
the total number of factors and parallel analysis as the lower limit. Hence, a three-step process
was formulated. First, the Kaiser rule would be assessed and used to set the upper limit of the
total number of possible solutions. Second, parallel analysis would be conducted and assessed to
set the lower limit for the number of solutions to be assessed. Lastly, the range of solutions
provided by both approaches would also be factor analyzed. For this multifaceted EFA factor
extraction decision process, it should also be noted that in the event of the Kaiser rule directing a
single factor solution, parallel analysis is rendered moot. As the purpose of parallel analysis is to
reduce the number of factors to be extracted compared to the Keiser rule. By restraining the
Goldberg method with these upper and lower limits, the resulting EFA decision process provided
a greater degree of a priori systematization and so serves to reduce researcher degrees of freedom
(i.e., with respect to choosing a solution from a set of competing solutions) while also preserving
the primacy of theory and its utility.
Factor Extraction, Loadings, and Markers of Simple Structure
While primary axis factoring is currently the most recommended estimation method for
factor extraction, this is only true in isolation as it is also recommended that multi-study factor
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analytic projects use one estimated method across all studies (Lee & Ashton, 2007; Meyers et al.,
2017; Sellbom, & Tellegen, 2019). This led the present work to the maximum likelihood
estimation method of factor extraction. Study 2 seeks to replicate the factor structure achieved
here in Study 1, but with the more constrained modeling procedure of confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA), requiring maximum likelihood estimation.
Multi-factor solutions need to go through a data rotation process to obtain simple
structure. Simple structure is the data’s optimal balance between all items loading highly (i.e.,
approaching 1) on their respective primary factors and lowly (i.e., approaching 0) on all others
whilst under the requirement that all items load on all factors (Lee & Ashton, 2007; Meyers et
al., 2017; Sellbom, & Tellegen, 2019). Any rotations to be performed here were planned to be
oblique promax rotations. The promax rotation method conducts the rotation process in several
stages. First the solution is rotated with an orthogonal (non-correlated) varimax rotation. This
allows the solution to first maximize the amount of variance that is unique to each factor (Lee &
Ashton, 2007; Meyers et al., 2017; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017). Then further rotations are
carried out in an oblique manner, slowly allowing the factors to correlate and reach simple
structure (Lee & Ashton, 2007; Meyers et al., 2017; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017). This is the most
conservative (i.e., mathematically constrained; procrustean) rotation solution available to EFA
and the reason for its inclusion.
Consistent with the EFA literature, several values were set a priori to serve as thresholds
and guide the process of determining simple structure among a potential handful of competing
factor solutions. A weakness of EFA is that factor solutions can be overly influenced by the
idiosyncrasies of the sample for which they are based (Lee & Ashton, 2007; Meyers et al., 2017;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017; Sellbom, & Tellegen, 2019). To offset this, conservative thresholds
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were used for factor loadings and communalities and an item’s factor loading was deemed
satisfactory if was ≥ 0.55 and its communality was ≥ 0.4. Also, individual factors within multifactor structures should be well correlated with each other (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017).
However, one of the primary signs that a given factor solution is over extracted is seen when two
or more factors within a multi-factor structure correlate too highly (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017).
Hence, the threshold for inter-factor correlations was < 0.7. Any inter-factor correlations
exceeding 0.7 were then to be taken as evidence of over extraction.
Structural Equation Modeling Approach
Hypotheses 2-6 were assessed through a two-stage structural equation modeling
(hereafter, SEM) procedure. In the first phase, a measurement model will be constructed to
assess the adequacy of the latent FWB and subjective well-being constructs (Meyers et al., 2017;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017). The measurement model phase is essentially equivalent to
confirmatory factor analysis (Meyers et al., 2017; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017). The goal here is
to simultaneously confirm that the observed FWB measures (i.e., FAD-Plus and the new PAP
measure) and subjective well-being measures (i.e., SWLS, GAD-7, PHQ-9) satisfactorily load
onto their corresponding hypothesized latent variables and that the resulting structure
satisfactorily fits the data.
Markers Informing Satisfactory Fit
By consult of the SEM method literature, several thresholds guided the process of
determining the adequacy of the SEM models. Consistent with recommendations, an observed
indicator’s factor loading was deemed satisfactory at ≥ 0.3 (≥ .3 indicating modest strength, ≥ .6
indicating substantial strength; Mayers et al., 2013). The measurement model was initially
assessed without the use of correlated errors. However, due to the well-known covariability of
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depression and anxiety symptomology (Aina & Susman, 2006; APA, 2013; Choi, Kim, & Jeon,
2020; Groen, 2020), it was predicted that the errors for these subjective well-being indicators
would need to be correlated to achieve satisfactory fit. No other modification indexes were
entertained.
Model fit is of substantial importance to SEM. At base, model fit determines the degree
to which the covariance matrix of a sample is equivalent to that of the estimated population
(Ullman, 2013). Model fit can be assessed through many different indices. Consistent with
recommendations, fit was assessed in a collective manor and interpreted on the basis of the
overall pattern suggested by the following indices: the normed fit index (NFI; Bentler & Bonett,
1980), the incremental fit index (IFI; Bollen, 1989b), the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler,
1988), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck, 1993), the
root mean square residual (RMR; Hu & Bentler, 1999), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI; Bentler,
1983), the adjusted fit index (AGFI; Tanaka & Huba, 1989), and the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1987; Bozdogan, 1987).
The NFI, IFI, CFI, and RMSEA belong to a subclass of fit indices referred to as
comparative fit indices. The approach to fit for these widely used indices is to establish where
the estimated model exists along a continuum ranging from total independence (i.e., completely
unrelated variables) to fully saturated (i.e., all variables are allowed to correlate). For the NFI,
IFI and CFI, values ≥ .9 and ≥ .95 indicate adequate fit and good fit, respectively (Bentler, 1988;
Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bollen, 1989b). For RMSEA, values ≤ .8 and ≤ .5 indicate adequate fit
and good fit, respectively (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).
The RMR belongs to the subclass of fit indices referred to as the residual-based fit
indices. The residual-based approach to fit compares the average differences between the sample
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variance (and covariance) and the estimated population variance (and covariance). For RMR,
values ≤ .08 and ≤ .05 indicate adequate fit and good fit, respectively (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
The GFI and AGFI belong to the subclass of fit indices referred to as the indices of
proportion of variance accounted for. Here, model fit corresponds to the amount of variability in
the sample covariance that can be explained by the estimated population covariance (Kenny,
2011). For the GFI and AGFI, values ≥ .9 and ≥ .95 indicate adequate fit and good fit,
respectively (Bentler, 1983; Tanaka & Huba, 1989).
The AIC belongs to the degree of parsimony subclass of fit indices. Several of the indices
above can overestimate the fitness (i.e., indicate greater fit) of a model as the number of
parameters estimated increases. Degree of parsimony fit indices are intended to reduce
overestimation of fitness by either penalizing complexity, rewarding parsimony, or both. The
AIC is intended for model comparisons and so at least two competing models are needed for AIC
to be interpretable. Smaller values indicate better fit (Akaike, 1987; Bozdogan, 1987).
Historically, model fit was assessed with a ꭓ2 test statistic. While the ꭓ2 remains a
commonly reported fit index, it is extremely sensitive and most often produces values indicating
poor fit for samples larger than 500. Therefore, many experts suggest the ꭓ2 to be of little
interpretive value when fitting models to relatively larger datasets (Kenny, 2011; Meyers et al.,
2017; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2017). Consequently, while the ꭓ2 will be reported, it will not be
treated as a fit index of interpretive value due to the relatively large sample size of the present
dataset.
Results
Exploratory Factor Analysis of PAP Items
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The first two eigenvalues of the data were 8.78 and 0.73. The Kaiser rule indicates a
single factor solution would best suit the data. Hence, parallel analysis was unnecessary. The
factor loadings from the one-factor solution’s factor matrix are presented in Table 1.2 on page
103. Ten items—1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20, 23—loaded onto a unitary PAP construct. These
ten items refer to primary PAP motifs, such as counterfactuals of freedom (i.e., items 1 and 3),
possible futures (i.e., items 8, 9, 10, and 12), action refrains (i.e., items 15, 17, and 20), and the
will-do vs. must-do distinction (i.e., item 23). It is important to note nearly all of the PAP motifs
that guided item construction (other than responsibility) were represented by at least one of the
ten items in this single-factor solution.
A second EFA was conducted on the preliminary 10-item PAP scale (hereafter, PAPS10) to assess the structure of the ten retained items absent the thirteen that were dropped. The
first two eigenvalues were 4.45 and 0.27. All ten items again loaded onto a single PAP factor,
with satisfactory loadings ranging from (λ = .615-.702); see Table 1.3, page 105. The ten-item
single PAP factor accounted for 50.1% of the variability amongst the items. The item
correlations (r = .33-.57; determinant = .02) and item-all correlations were satisfactory (r = .57.67). Lastly, estimates of internal reliability indicated a high level of interitem coherence (α =
.888, ω = .889).
The average PAPS-10 scores for each participant were calculated to assess indicators of
construct validity, as well as any potential demographic differences in PAP FWB. As a measure
of FWB, participant’s PAPS-10 scores should be positively associated with their FAD-Plus FWB
scores at an effect size that is on the weaker end of strong (i.e., r ≈ .55-.69). Such a result would
be preliminary evidence of convergent validity. As the PAPS-10 is intended to be a measure of
FWB and not perceived personal control, participant’s PAPS-10 scores should be positively
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associated with their LOCI scores; ideally at an effect size no stronger than moderate (i.e., r = .3.45). Such a result would be preliminary evidence of divergent validity. The data supported these
expectations; see Table 1.4, page 106. Participant’s PAPS-10 scores were strongly—though not
too strongly—and positively correlated with their FAD-Plus FWB scores (r = .59), as well as
moderately and positively correlated to their LOCI scores (r = .41). The unitary factor that
emerged from this data satisfied all the factor analytic requirements of the multi-faceted EFA
approach established for this study. Moreover, the single factor of the PAPS-10 is coherent and
substantially aligns with the theoretical conceptualization of PAP portrayed in the literature (i.e.,
possessing all relevant PAP motifs). The preliminary PAPS-10 is inferred to have approximated
participant’s true PAP FWB. That is, PAPS-10 is determined as having demonstrated a good
degree of face and content validity, as well as a promising—though merely preliminary—degree
of convergent and divergent validity.
The average PAPS-10 scores for each participant were calculated to assess demographic
differences in PAP FWB. No gender differences [Men M = 4.89, Women M = 4.83, t(978) =
1.35, p > .05] or racial differences [White M = 4.89, Black M = 4.83, Latinx M = 4.79, American
Indian or Alaska Native M = 5.37, Asian M 4.73, Hawaiian or Pacific Islander M = 5.22, F(6,
978) = 2.16, p > .05] in participant’s PAP FWB were observed.
Exploratory Factor Analysis of all FWB Items
A third EFA was conducted with all 10 PAP items and all items of the FAD-Plus to
further determine the factor structure of these FWB items. Because EFA is a data-centric (as
opposed to a theory-centric) approach, using an EFA with all FWB items together serves as a
more rigorous assessment of the factor structure of the new PAP measure. This EFA reviled a
three-factor model with all the 10 PAP items loading onto a single factor (factor 1) and the FAD-
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Plus FWB items loading onto two factors (see table 1.4 on page 106 for all factor loadings). Four
of the FAD-Plus items loaded onto factor 2, one FAD-Plus item loaded onto factor 3, and two
FAD-Plus items failed to load on factors 1-3. These results provide strong evidence that 10 PAP
items do indeed form a single PAP FWB factor that is distinct from the volition FWB factor of
the FAD-Plus.
SEM of FWB on SWB
Descriptive statistics were conducted for all measures and satisfactory levels of
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity were found; see Table 1.5, page 107. Tests of
hypotheses 2-5 were assessed through structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood
estimation. The structural equation model (SEM) was developed using AMOS 25.0 (Arbuckle,
2014) to substantiate the hypothesized pattern of relations among the latent variables leading
from FWB and LOC to SWB. For this analysis, it was first hypothesized that the satisfaction
with life, anxiety, and depression measures would load onto one superordinate SWB construct.
Second, it was hypothesized that both the volition (i.e., FAD-Plus) and PAP themes of FWB
would load onto one superordinate FWB construct. It was then hypothesized that FWB and LOC
would directly and positively relate to subjective well-being. Finally, it was hypothesized that
locus of control would mediate the relationship between FWB and SWB.
Contrary to prediction, the first measurement model—wherein the error terms for anxiety
and depression were not allowed to corelate—fit the data better than expected. Most of the fit
indices for this measurement model met the thresholds required for adequate-good model fit.
However, RMSEA indicated that the model poorly fit the data; see Figure 1.4, page 94. The
second measurement model was still conducted, as it is desirable to account for the strong
correlation between anxiety and depression.
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As predicted, the second measurement model with correlated error terms for anxiety and
depression fit the data better than measurement model 1. The model was satisfactorily
multivariate normal (Mardia’s coefficient = 8.23, CR = 13.26) and all fit indices indicated good
model fit; see Figure 1.5, page 95. The second measurement model also supported hypotheses 2
and 3 of this study. Specifically, the hypothesized superordinate latent constructs for both
subjective well-being and FWB were supported by the data. All factor loadings ranged from
medium to strong (.40-.97), with most being strong. Lastly, subjective well-being, FWB, and
locus of control were all positively associated. Due to the well-fitting nature of the second
measurement model, the SEM advanced to the structural model phase.
From a model fit perspective, the structural model was statistically equivalent to
measurement model 2. That was due to the fact that the only real change to the model was from
bidirectional arrows to unidirectional arrows for the FWB, locus of control, and subjective wellbeing variables. Nevertheless, the capstone hypothesis of this study required mediation,
necessitating the move from measurement model (i.e., with bidirectional arrows) to structural
model (i.e., unidirectional arrows).
As predicted, the structural model supported hypotheses 4-6 for this study; see Figure 1.6,
page 96. Specifically, FWB and locus of control both directly and positively relate to subjective
well-being; respectively (b = .17, p = .03; b = .33, p < .001). Also, there was a significant indirect
effect for FWB on subjective well-being through locus of control (b = .23, ꞵ = .14, p < .001).
Such that, greater FWB predicted more adaptive subjective well-being through FWB’s positive
relationship with locus of control. Importantly, the significant direct effect for FWB on
subjective well-being was evidenced in the presence of the mediator, locus of control. Lastly, the
total effect for FWB on subjective well-being was also significant (b = .40, ꞵ = .25, p < .001).
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Discussion of Study 1
One of the two objectives of this study was to develop a new PAP measure of FWB, as
well as empirically assess the relationship between FWB and SWB. A unitary, 10-item PAP
factor emerged from the factor analytic procedure. The new PAPS-10 measure shows
preliminary evidence of indeed being PAP-themed measure of FWB, as well as being distinct
from the commonly used volition themed measure of FWB (i.e., FAD-Plus). Furthermore, this
study provides preliminary evidence of the pragmatic utility of the PAPS-10 by way of the
relative success of the SEM approach used here. Specifically, the PAPS-10 and the FAD-Plus
loaded onto a superordinate FWB construct which was then successfully modeled to predict
subjective well-being. By combining the two core FWB themes of volition and PAP into a
superordinate FWB construct—as was done here, FWB researchers may be better equipped to
test hypotheses and model FWB theories. Of course, that is the goal, not the current reality. The
PAPS-10 needs to be replicated and subjected to further scrutiny. Study 2 of this multi-study
project seeks to continue that work by replication.
The other primary focus of this study was to empirically assess the relationship between
FWB and subjective well-being. Three hypotheses were formulated to do so. I hypothesized that
greater FWB would predict more adaptive subjective well-being (i.e., greater satisfaction with
life and less depression and anxiety), that locus of control would do the same, and that the FWBsubjective well-being relationship would be mediated by locus of control. All three of these
hypotheses were supported by the data. Moreover, a direct effect for FWB on subjective wellbeing was observed. The SEM structure observed here supports the general adaptiveness of FWB
suggested by the cultural-animal model.
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While all hypotheses for this study were supported, the SEM structure observed for this
data should be replicated in another sample. The single factor structure of the new PAP FWB
measure should also be reassessed and replicated in another sample as EFA can be vulnerable to
extant sample idiosyncrasies. Replication of the findings presented here (both EFA and SEM)
will provide further evidence in support of the FWB to subjective well-being theoretical model,
as well as increase the indicated validity of the single factor PAP FWB measure. Such is the goal
and scope of Study 2.
Study 2: Overview
The goal of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1. I hypothesized that the
single factor PAP FWB measure that emerged from the data of the prior study would emerge of
the data here. I also hypothesized that the FWB to subjective well-being SEM evidenced in the
prior study would be observed by the data here. Nearly the same hypotheses from Study 1 (i.e.,
hypotheses 2-6) were carried over to this study. Due to the observed single factor structure of
PAPS-10, hypothesis 1 was updated to reflect that fact. The same methodological and analytic
approaches from Study 1 were repeated here with fidelity. An online cross-sectional survey
method was implemented to assess the following six hypotheses:
H1: The unitary PAP FWB factor structure of PAPS-10 will be confirmed.
H2: The depression, anxiety, and life satisfaction measures will load onto one
superordinate latent construct of well-being.
H3: The new PAP FWB factor (i.e., PAPS-10) and the commonly used volitional FWB
factor (i.e., FAD-Plus FW subscale) will load onto one superordinate latent construct
of FWB.
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H4: The latent FWB variable will have a direct and positive relationship with the latent
well-being variable.
H5: Internal locus of control will have a direct and positive relationship with the latent
FWB and subjective well-being variables.
H6: the FWB and SWB relationship will remain significant after accounting for the
predicted relationships for locus of control.
Study 2: Method
Participants
Survey respondents were undergraduate college students from the greater Richmond,
Virginia (VA) area. A total of 919 people, ranging from 18 to 49 years of age (M = 19.05, SD =
2.18) completed the survey. The sample was mostly women (68%) and mostly White/Caucasian
but, consistent with Study 1, fairly diverse (42%, 21.5% Black/African American, 17% Asian,
9.5% Latinx, 9% other, 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander). Each person that participated in
the study received credits towards research participation requirements, the result of class or
departmental policy.
Materials and Procedure
The survey was implemented identically to that of Study 1. The online survey recruited
people through SONA Systems. After they consented to the study, the participants were
redirected to a Qualtrics portal to complete the survey. The same measures aimed at assessing
people’s subjective well-being (i.e., depression, anxiety, and satisfaction with life), FWB, LOC,
and demographic characteristics from Study 1 were used in Study 2 with fidelity.
Measures
Subjective Well-Being
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The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985;
Pavot, & Diener, 2008), was again used as a positive indicator of subjective well-being. The
response format was a 6-point Likert (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree). As before, the
Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale (GAD-7) and Patient Depression Questionnaire (PHQ-9)
were used to assess participant’s normative (i.e., non-clinical) levels of anxious and depressive
symptomatology (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2001; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams &
Lowe, 2006), and served as negative indicators of subjective well-being. Participants rated how
often (over the last two weeks) they felt bothered by anxious and depressive symptomology. The
response format was again a 4-point scale (1 = Not at all, 4 = Nearly every day). Assessments of
internal reliability for this data indicated that these three measures possessed a strong degree of
interitem coherence (SWLS, α = .89, ω = .89; GAD-7, α = .90, ω = .90; PHQ-9, α = .86, ω =
.86).
Free Will Beliefs
The four items from the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) were again used as an
assessment of participant’s volition themed FWB, while the new PAPS-10 was used as an
assessment of participant’s PAP themed FWB. The response format for both FWB measures was
again a 6-point Likert (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree). Assessments of internal
reliability for this data indicated that these measures possessed an adequate to strong degree of
interitem coherence (FAD-Plus FW subscale, α = .75, ω = .75; PAPS-10, α = .91, ω = .91).
Locus of Control
The brief measure of internal LOC (Lumpkin, 1988) used in the previous study was used
again here to assess participant’s perceived personal control over their lives. The response format
was a 6-point Likert (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree) as it was previously. An
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assessment of internal reliability for this data indicated that this measure possessed an adequate
degree of interitem coherence (α = .84, ω = .84).
Attention Checks
To help ensure the online survey would produce trustworthy data, the two attention check
items from the previous study were used again here, in Study 2. Participants were directly asked
to “Please choose ‘Strongly disagree’ for this item” and to “Please choose ‘Strongly agree’ for
this item” (see Marjanovic et al., 2014). The response format for these two attention check items
was a 6-point Likert (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree). As was done in the first study,
both items were each assessed twice at random. Also, as was the case for the first study, a
conservative standard was set for these items. Participants needed to provide the correct answers
to all four of these items to be included data analyses.
Data Analyses
After screening the data for inattentive respondents, 159 (17%) were classified as
inattentive and excluded from analyses. The final sample (N = 760), for which the following
analyses are based, remained demographically equivalent to the initial sample. Participants were
18 to 49 years of age (M = 19.79, SD = 2.94), mostly women (69%) and mostly White/Caucasian
(42%, 21.5% Black/African American, 17% Asian, 9.5% Latinx, 9% other, 1% Native Hawaiian
or Pacific Islander). Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations were conducted for all
measures (see Table 2.1, page 108). The assumptions of univariate normality, linearity, and
heteroscedasticity were satisfied. Hypothesis 1 was assessed with an EFA. Tests of hypotheses 25 were assessed through structural equation modeling with maximum likelihood estimation.
Factor Analytic Approach for PAPS-10
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The decision regarding the number of factors to extract no longer contains as much
potential for researcher bias to occlude factor analytic judgement because the preliminary PAPS10 measure directs the extraction of a single PAP factor. The EFA strategy for this study first
sought to replicate the PAPS-10 EFA results observed in Study 1. The more conservative
numerical thresholds abided to in Study 1 were not used here, as the present EFA enjoys greater
theoretical grounding. The more customary thresholds for satisfactory factor loadings (i.e., 0.5)
and communalities (i.e., 0.3) were used. The multi-faceted EFA approach constructed for and
described in Study 1 still served as a guide in Study 2. In the event the PAPS-10 failed to
replicate, said multi-faceted EFA approach was to be followed.
Structural Equation Modeling Approach
In line with replicating Study 1, hypotheses 2-6 were assessed through a two-stage SEM
procedure consisting of a measurement model (first phase) and a structural model (second
phase). Wherein the measurement model assesses the adequacy of the latent FWB and subjective
well-being constructs, and the structural model assesses the hypothesized theoretical model
predicting subjective well-being from FWB as mediated by LOCI. For the SEM, factor loadings
were deemed satisfactory at ≥ 0.3 (≥ .3 indicating modest strength, ≥ .6 indicating substantial
strength; Mayers et al., 2013). As was the case for Study 1, the measurement model was initially
assessed without the use of correlated errors for anxiety and depression. It was again predicted
that by allowing anxiety and depression to correlate in the SEM that better and more realistic
model fit would result.
The indices of model fit used for the previous study were again used in the same way
here. For the NFI, IFI and CFI, values ≥ .9 and ≥ .95 indicate adequate fit and good fit,
respectively (Bentler, 1988; Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bollen, 1989). For RMSEA, values ≤ .8 and
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≤ .5 indicate adequate fit and good fit, respectively (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). For RMR, values
≤ .08 and ≤ .05 indicate adequate fit and good fit, respectively (Hu & Bentler, 1999). For the GFI
and AGFI, values ≥ .9 and ≥ .95 indicate adequate fit and good fit, respectively (Bentler, 1983;
Tanaka & Huba, 1989). The AIC is intended for model comparisons, smaller values indicate
better fit (Akaike, 1987; Bozdogan, 1987). Also, while the ꭓ2 model fit will be reported, it will
not be treated as a fit index of interpretive value due to the relatively large sample size of the
present dataset and the likelihood of the ꭓ2 value to indicate poor fit regardless.
Results
PAPS-10 Exploratory Factor Analysis
The EFA results for the PAPS-10 fully replicated the single factor solution that emerged
from Study 1. Consistent with both the spirit of replication and the Kaiser rule, the first two
eigenvalues of the data were 3.95 and 0.31. Indicating that a single factor solution for the PAPS10 would best suit the data. All ten items loaded onto the single PAP factor with satisfactory
loadings (λ = .57-.68); see Table 2.2, page 109. The PAPS-10 accounted for 45.53% of the
variability amongst the items. The item correlations (r = .25-.52; determinant = .037) and itemall correlations for the PAPS-10 were satisfactory (r = .52-.63) and estimates of internal
reliability were again found to indicate a high level of interitem coherence (α = .866, ω = .867).
Average scores for the 10-item PAP scale were calculated for each participant to assess
demographic differences in PAP FWB. Consistent with the previous study, no gender differences
[Men M = 4.89, Women M = 4.85, t(747) = 0.74, p > .05] nor racial differences [White M = 4.85,
Black M = 4.96, Latinx M = 4.79, American Indian or Alaska Native M = 4.10, Asian M = 4.83,
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander M = 4.63, F(6, 752) = 1.20, p > .05.] in participant’s PAP FWB
were observed.
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Exploratory Factor Analysis of all FWB Items
A was done in the prior study, another EFA was conducted with all 10 PAP items and all
items of the FAD-Plus to get a more rigorous assessment of the factor structure of the new PAP
measure. As was the case in the prior study, this EFA reviled a three-factor model with all 10
PAP items loading onto a single factor (factor 1) and the FAD-Plus FWB items loading onto two
factors (see table 2.3 on page 110 for all factor loadings). Four of the FAD-Plus items loaded
onto factor 2, two FAD-Plus items loaded onto factor 3, and one FAD-Plus item failed to load on
factors 1, 2, or 3. These results replicate the prior study’s findings and provide strong evidence
that the 10 PAP items form a single PAP FWB factor that is distinct from the volition FWB
factor of the FAD-Plus.
Structural Equation Model for Free Will Belief on Well-Being
A structural equation model (SEM) was constructed with AMOS 25.0 (Arbuckle, 2014)
to test the hypothesized structure predicting subjective well-being from FWB through LOCI. In
line with the previous study, it was hypothesized that the superordinate latent variable of
subjective well-being would be substantiated by the indicators of satisfaction with life, anxiety,
and depression (i.e., SWLS, GAD-7, PHQ-9; respectively). It was also hypothesized that the
superordinate latent FWB variable would be substantiated by the indicators of the volition FWB
theme and the PAP FWB theme (i.e., FAD-Plus FW, PAPS-10; respectively). Next, it was
hypothesized that FWB and LOCI would directly and positively relate to subjective well-being.
Lastly, it was hypothesized that LOCI would mediate the relationship between FWB and
subjective well-being.
The Measurement Model
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As was also true of Study 1, the first measurement model for this data portrayed poorer
fit indices than the second measurement model, wherein the errors for the anxiety and depression
indicators were modeled to correlated. See Figure 2.1 on page 97 for more details of the initial
measurement model. The second measurement model was multivariate normal (Mardia’s
coefficient = 12.75, CR = 17.97) and fit the data satisfactorily; see Figure 2.2, page 98.
Consistent with the findings from Study 1, the superordinate latent variables for subjective wellbeing and FWB emerged from the data with satisfactory loadings (ranging from .48-.80). This
data successfully replicated the first study’s findings for hypotheses 2 and 3 and the SEM
procedure advanced to the structural model phase.
The Structural Model
The structural model constructed to replicate the findings for hypotheses 4-6 was again
statistically equivalent (i.e., same model fit indices) to the second measurement model for this
study due to the numerical equivalence of bidirectional and unidirectional arrows. As predicted,
results of the structural model replicated the first study’s findings for hypotheses 4-6; see Figure
3, page 99. Specifically, FWB and LOCI both directly and positively predicted subjective wellbeing (b = .18, p = .039; b = .69, p < .001; respectively). The indirect effect for FWB on
subjective well-being through LOCI was significant (b = .17, ꞵ = .13, p < .001). Such that,
greater FWB predicted more adaptive subjective well-being through the positive relationship
between FWB and LOCI. The significant total effect for FWB on subjective well-being observed
in Study 1 was also replicated (b = .34, ꞵ = .27, p < .001).
Discussion of Study 2
This study set out to replicate the findings of Study 1. To that end it was a success. The
same single factor structure for PAP FWB that emerged from the EFA in Study 1 also emerged
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from the EFA performed on this data. This provides further evidence to suggest that the PAPS10 is indeed capturing a unitary PAP themed FWB. This study also evidences the PAPS-10 as
distinct from the free will subscale of the FAD-Plus, the volition-themed FWB measure.
Furthermore, due to the successful replication of the FWB to subjective well-being SEM, this
study also further exemplifies the PAPS-10’s pragmatic utility by way of the relative success of
the SEM approach used here. As found in the first study, the PAPS-10 and the FAD-Plus loaded
onto one superordinate FWB construct which then predicted subjective well-being. Specifically,
people with greater FWB were also found to have more adaptive subjective well-being scores
(i.e., greater satisfaction with life and less depression and anxiety). As was true of the first study,
the FWB to subjective well-being relationship was both direct and indirect. Greater FWB
predicted more adaptive subjective well-being through greater perceived personal control.
Discussion of Studies 1 and 2
Gooding and colleagues claimed, “the predictive utility of FWB on personal life
outcomes is abolished when controlling for personal choice” (2018, p. 5). In contrast to Gooding
et al., the presently reported research found a direct effect for FWB to SWB while accounting for
LOC as a mediating variable; Providing evidence in favor of Zhao and Huo (2022) and others
(Collier & Shi, 2020; Kondratowicz-Nowak & Zawadzka, 2018; Li et al., 2017; Li & Wong;
2020; Moynihan, Igou, van Tilburg; 2017) by again supporting the positive connection between
FWB and SWB.
Studies 1 and 2 presented evidence supporting the PAPS-10 as a validity and internally
reliable measure of the PAP FWB construct. The two previous studies also presented
correlational evidence in support of the FWB to subjective well-being model that is predicted by
the adaptive purpose imbuing function of FWB as detailed in my literature review. However,
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while the results of the previous studies are promising, more rigorous assessments of the PAPS10 ‘s construct validity and reliability (specifically, test-retest reliability) were needed to more
firmly establish the PAPS-10 as a valid and reliable measure of the PAP FWB construct. The
methodology of Study was designed to satisfy such needs. Also, while the SEMs employed in
the previous studies supported the overall adaptive function of FWB for subjective well-being
hypothesis, the methodologies that were employed were merely correlational. Therefore, the
casual path from FWB to subjective well-being predicted by the both the cultural-animal model
of FWB and implied by the observed SEM structures of studies 1 and 2 warranted experimental
testing. Furthermore, the previous studies only assessed the mere adaptive role of FWB, leaving
any mechanistic theoretical claims (e.g., FWB as purpose-imbuing) unexamined. The
methodology of Study 4 was then designed to assess the causal path of FWB to SWB predicted
by the purpose-imbuing model of FWB.
Overview of Study 3
The findings from studies 1 and 2 provided preliminary evidence in support of the PAPS10’s construct validity as a measure of the free will belief (FWB) theme known as the principal
of alternate possibilities (PAP), as well as its inter-item reliability. However, such evidence was
not yet complete and could not satisfy the methodological and evidential demands required for
confidently inferring adequate construct validity and reliability. The PAPS-10 needed more
rigorous and holistic evidence in support of adequate levels divergent validity. Also, the PAPS10 measure needed to pass a thorough assessment of reliability by evidencing an adequate
amount of test-retest reliability; as worldview-level beliefs are, in theory, closer in kind to trait
level phenomena with some state-like characteristics (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; KoltkoRivera, 2004; Nilsson, 2014; Steyer, Ferring, & Schmitt, 1992; Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999).
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The purpose of Study 3 was to provide such evidence and therefore reasonably infer the
adequacy of the PAPS-10’s construct validity and reliability.
The primary aims of Study 3 were fourfold. First, this study was conducted to confirm
the factor structure of the PAPS-10 through using the more restrictive factor analytic procedure
known as confirmatory factor analysis, as opposed to the less restrictive factor analytic procedure
previously used (i.e., exploratory factor analysis) in Studies 1 & 2. Second, this study assessed
the construct validity (i.e., discriminant validity) of the new PAPS-10 measure by assessing the
measure’s associations to a host of potentially related yet theoretically and conceptually distinct
phenomena (e.g., self-control, time orientation, rumination etc.). Next, this study assessed the
predictive/criterion validity of the PAPS-10 by using the construct’s philosophically and
psychologically accurate definition as the criterion. Lastly, this study assessed the temporal
stability (i.e., test-retest reliability) of the PAPS-10 across a one-week interval.
Accordingly, I hypothesized:
H1: The single factor structure of the PAPS-10 measure would be replicated by
confirmatory factor analysis.
H2: The correlation coefficients estimating the relationships between the PAPS-10 and all
other included measures (e.g., LOC, self-control, mindset, rumination) would not
exceed a medium effect size (i.e., r ≤ .45); thereby indicating satisfactory divergent
validity.
H3: Participants PAPS-10 scores would strongly and positively predict the degree to
which they agree with the definition of PAP as being an accurate description of free
will; thereby indicating criterion validity.
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H4: The correlation coefficient estimating the temporal stability between the Timepoint 1
PAPS-10 score and the Timepoint 2 PAPS-10 score would be positive, significant,
and indicate satisfactory stability (i.e., r ≥ .5); thereby indicating satisfactory testretest reliability.
Several specific hypotheses regarding Hypothesis 2 can be stated. First, I hypothesized that the
PAPS-10 FWB measure would be positively associated with the FAD-Plus FWB measure, but
that this association would not exceed a medium effect size (i.e., r ≤ .45), indicating consistency
but non-redundancy (i.e., r ≤ .45) between both FWB measures. I also hypothesized that the
PAPS-10 FWB measure would be positively yet moderately associated (i.e., r ≤ .45) with
measures of personal control (i.e., locus of control, self-mastery, trait self-control) and growth
(i.e., growth mindset), indicating evidence of divergent validity for the PAPS-10. I also
hypothesize that the PAPS-10 FWB measure would be positively associated (i.e., r ≤ .45) with
measures of temporal orientation and ruminative tendencies, providing evidence of divergent
validity for the PAPS-10. Lastly, I hypothesized that the new PAPS-10 FWB measure would be
positively but weakly (i.e., r ≤ .25) associated the personality trait of conscientiousness.
Method
Participants
The participants (N = 215) were a nationally representative sample of United States
citizens (see Table 3.1 on page 111 for demographics) recruited from Prolific
(https://prolific.co/). Formerly known as Prolific Academic, Prolific is a for-profit company
aimed at providing researchers access to pool of a well-motivated and attentive participants.
Functioning much like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, Prolific claims that data collected from their
service is free from bots and provided by motivated and attentive participants who have been
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vetted by the service (Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). People needed to be at least 18
years of age to participate in this study and were required to complete the entire study (i.e.,
Timepoint 1 and Timepoint 2) to receive compensation for their time. All participants were paid
$8 for completing the survey.
Materials and Procedure
This study was a short-term, two-timepoint, longitudinal online survey. The survey was
implemented through Qualtrics and disseminated by the Prolific service. After reading a short
description of the study and its requirements, each participant provided their informed consent
and was then linked to the survey. Data collection occurred at two timepoints separated by at
least one week. All variables listed in the measures section below were assessed at Timepoint 1,
and only the PAP-10 FWB measure was assessed at Timepoint 2.
Measures
Free Will Beliefs
Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD-Plus). The same four items from the free will
subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) were used to measure participant levels of
the volition FWB factor. Participants indicated their level of agreement to each item on a 6-point
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) exemplified by: “people have complete control
over the decisions they make;” and “strength of mind can always overcome the body's desires.”
Scores were calculated by averaging participant responses across the items, with higher scores
indicating greater volition FWB. For this sample, the measure produced an acceptable degree of
inter-item reliability (α = .74, ω = .74).
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities Scale (PAPS-10). As the primary purpose of
this study is to provide further validation and reliability testing of the new PAPS-10 FWB
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measure, the PAPS-10 items supported by Study 2 of this work were include. This allowed for
assessing the remaining questions of discriminant validity of the PAPS-10 with psychological
constructs such as perceived control, trait self-control, self-mastery, future-mindedness,
ruminative tendencies, as well as common personality and individual difference measures
included for the reason of employing best practices.
The 10 PAP items were used to measure participant levels of the PAP FWB factor.
Participants indicated their level of agreement to each item on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 6 = strongly agree) and scores were calculated by averaging participant responses
across the items, with higher scores indicating greater PAP FWB. For this sample, the measure
produced a high degree of inter-item reliability (α = .95, ω = .95).
PAPS-10 Criterion Validity. The psychological definitions for both the volition and PAP
FWB factors were used as criterions to assess the predictive/ criterion validity of the new PAPS10 measure of FWB. Participants were presented with the psychological definitions for both
FWB factors in unison and then rated their level of agreement with each FWB factor’s definition
(1=Strongly Disagree, 6 Strongly Agree). See appendix, page 124 for details.
Personal Control Perceptions and Beliefs
Locus of Control. The brief measure of Locus of Control (Lumpkin, 1988) was used to
assess participant levels of perceived personal control over their lives. This was included to add
further documentation of the conceptual and empirical distinction between FWB and LOC
constructs. In this sample, this three item Likert scale was shown to have a high degree of interitem reliability (α = 86, ω = .86) and is exemplified by: “when I get what I want, it is usually
because I worked hard for it.” This brief internal LOC measure was assessed with a 6-point
rating scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) and the average of the items was
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calculated to serve as each participant’s LOC score. Higher LOC scores indicated greater
participant levels of perceived personal control.
Self-Mastery. Another common assessment of personal control beliefs is found in the
Self-Mastery Scale (SMS, AKA the Personal Mastery Scale or Pearlin Mastery Scale, Pearlin &
Schooler, 1978) and is frequently used in health research to assess the extent to which people
believe they are in control of their own lives, or the degree to which one believes they can
control life events and circumstances. Do the possibility of conceptual and empirical overlap
between personal control beliefs and the PAP factor of FWB, this study assessed participant
SMS scores. The 7-item Likert-type measure was assessed on a 6-point rating scale (1 = strongly
agree, 6 = strongly disagree), exemplified by the following items: “I can do just about anything I
really set my mind to do,” and “what happens to me in the future mostly depends on me.” In this
sample, the SMS produced acceptable levels of inter-item agreement (α = .75, ω = .74).
Trait Level Self-Control. Self-control conceptualized as “the self’s capacity to override
or change one’s inner responses, as well as to interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies and to
refrain from acting on them” (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004, p. 274). It could be the case
that the PAP-10 is conceptually confounded with or inadvertently taps into trait-level self-control
as opposed to belief in PAP. The Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS, Tangney et al., 2004) was
assessed to test this possibility and provide empirical evidence for the conceptual distinctiveness
between the PAPS-10 and the BSCS. Focusing on the behavioral aspects of self-control (e.g.,
habit formation, task perseverance), the BSCS is a 13-item Likert-type measure that asks people
to assess the degree to which a behavioral description corresponds to their own behavior. In this
study, the measure was assessed with a 6-point scale (1 = Not at all, 6 = Very much) and
produced a good degree of inter-item agreement (α = .78, ω = .78).
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Temporal Perspectives and Orientations
Future-mindedness (aka prospection) is the uniquely human ability to generate and then
evaluate mental representations of possible futures (emphasis added; Seligman, Railton,
Baumeister & Sripada, 2016; Seligman, 2012); hence, future-mindedness. Do recall the PAP
theme of FWB. As described by Baumeister and Monroe (2014), PAP FWB is a belief in the
possibility of multiple courses of action stemming from the same present. The psychology of
future-mindedness is a growing field (Osman, 2014; Wittmann & Butler, 2016; Macleod, 2017)
with a literature reporting robust adaptive effects for well-being. Trait level future-mindedness,
as well as training interventions oriented around future-mindedness, have been shown to increase
motivation and adaptive decision-making strategies within goal-directed behaviors, and positive
mental health outcomes across a range of normative sub-clinical conditions (Daugherty & Brase,
2010; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Linley, Harrington & Wood, 2006; Visser & Hirsch,
2014; Spreng, Mar & Kim, 2009).
The PAP theme of FWB is suffused with clear notions of temporal distinctiveness, such
as the belief in multiple possible futures and courses of action, as well as beliefs in the
ontological possibly of true counter-factual statements (e.g., had one not partied last night, one
would have gotten a better exam grade). As the PAP-10 was designed to assess this temporally
laden facet of FWB, future-mindedness was assessed to obtain evidence of the conceptual
distinctiveness between future-mindedness and PAP FWB.
Zimbardo Time Perception Inventory (ZTPI). This individual differences measures of
temporal orientations assesses trait-level orientations to time that are affect laden (Zimbardo &
Boyd, 1999). As a result, this 56-item inventory consists of five subscales designed to capture the
affect laden aspects of time orientation, Those of Past-Negative, Past-Positive, Present-
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Hedonistic, Present-Fatalistic, and Future. To attenuate concern over participant fatigue, only the
Past-Negative, Past-Positive, and Future subscales were assessed. Participants respond to a
Likert-type measure asking them to indicate the degree to which descriptions are characteristic of
themselves. In this study, this measure was assessed on a 6-point scale (1 = very uncharacteristic,
6 = very characteristic) and produced adequate to good estimates of inter-item reliability in this
sample (α / ω = 0.74 - 0.82).
Ruminative Tendencies
For much the same reasons put forward arguing for the inclusion of a time orientation
assessment, so too should this work include an assessment of trait-level ruminative tendencies.
Rumination involves one’s mental time travel to the past for the purpose of engaging in
maladaptive counter-factual thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). While
much of the research on counter-factual thinking revolves around its maladaptive engagement
(i.e., rumination), research accumulated over the past decade has provided more nuance to the
connection between counter-factual thinking and its maladaptive vs. adaptive effects. While it is
indeed the case that rumination is a maladaptive form of counter-factual thinking, it is not the
case that counter-factual thinking—just as such—is maladaptive. Rather, evidence suggests that
when done for relatively short durations (free from repeated metal time-travel to the same event),
counter-factual thinking is actually associated with adaptive outcomes for well-being.
The Ruminative Responses Scale. Individual differences in ruminative tendencies were
assessed with the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS, Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema,
2003). This10-item measure assesses two key dimensions of rumination, with 5 items assessing a
maladaptive brooding form of rumination, and 5 items assessing a largely adaptive reflective for
of rumination. Only the 5 reflective rumination items were used. Participants responded to a
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Likert-type rating scale that asked them to indicate the degree to which they think or do the
following when feeling down sad or depressed. In this study, this measure was assessed with a 6point scale (1 = almost never, 6 = almost always). Reflective rumination is exemplified by “go
someplace alone to think about your feelings.” For this sample, the measure produced a good
degree of inter-item reliability (α = 0.83., ω = 0.82).
Mindset
Research by Dweck and colleagues (1995, 1999, 2006) has reliably established the
existence of an individual difference factor that can greatly shape one’s assumptions of what they
are capable of and what is possible for them to achieve. This factor is referred to as one’s
mindset. Mindsets align with either a growth perspective or a fixed perspective. A growth
mindset holds to the perspective of inherent unfixedness of personal ability. Therefore, the
growth mindset is marked by its belief in the potential for meaningful personal growth. The fixed
perspective is the exact opposite and characterized by the belief in the inherent fixedness of
personal ability. This growth vs. fixed dichotomy has the potential to be strongly correlated with
FWB and the PAP FWB in particular. In light of this, the present research assessed individual
differences in people’s mindset to provide evidence of satisfactory discriminant validity for the
PAPS-10 from growth vs. fixed mindsets.
The Growth Mindset Scale. The 3-Item Growth Mindset Scale (Dweck, 1995, 1999,
2006) was used to assess the degree to which people view personal ability to be a fixed and static
endowment vs. a dynamic and open-ended potentiality (1995, 1999, 2006). In this study,
participants respond to this measure by way of a 6-point Likert-type agreement rating (1 =
strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree), exemplified by: “People can do things differently, but the
important parts of who they are can’t really be changed.” This measure has been well evidence
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as possessing good inter-item reliability, test-retest reliability, and repeated confirmations of
construct validity (1995, 1999, 2006). In this sample, the measure produced a good degree of
inter-item reliability (α = 0.77, ω = 0.77).
Big-5 Personality Traits
For the purpose of best practice, psychometric investigations into newly developed
measures of trait-level constructs or pseudo-trait-level constructs (beliefs can often take on traitlike characteristics), should also include comparisons of the new measure with the core
personality traits known as the BIG-5. These 5, and nearly universally agreed upon, personality
factors are openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and
neuroticism. This study assessed the Big-5 traits with the Big Five Inventory‐10 (BFI‐10,
Rammstedt, & John, 2007), this short measure of the Big-5 traits produced good levels of interitem reliability in this sample (α = 0.78-86, ω = 0.77-85)
Attention Checks
Inattentive responding is a methodological threat to internal validity surveys, especially
online surveys. In this study, a participant was considered to be an inattentive responder if they
answered survey questions with marked disregard for the content of the items (Berry et al., 2016;
Huang et al., 2015). Inattentive responders can take a random approach to responding (i.e.,
random selection of response options) or a non-random approach to responding (i.e., systematic
selection of the same response option). This can produce response patterns that may look like
acquiescence, extreme responding, or fence siting (Berry et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2015), but are
in fact mere inattentiveness. Two different items aimed at assessing participant inattentiveness
were used: “Please choose ‘strongly disagree’ for this item” and “Please choose ‘strongly agree’
for this item” (see Marjanovic, Struthers, Cribbie, & Greenglass, 2014). Both items were used
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twice throughout the survey and were done so at random. Responses other than “strongly
disagree” (i.e., for the question “Please choose ‘strongly disagree’ for this item”) and “strongly
agree” (i.e., for the question “Please choose ‘strongly agree’ for this item”) were classified as
random and then assumed to indicate participant inattentiveness. This research used a very
conservative standard for determining inattentiveness. Participants needed to pass all four of
these questions to be included in the final analyses.
Data Analyses
After screening that data for inattentive participants, the final sample size was 212. The
data was checked for meeting the assumptions of the general linear model and passed all
assumption checks. Factor scores for all measures were achieved using the average score (as
opposed to sum scores) for each participant across each of the respective measures. Hypothesis 1
was assessed with a confirmatory factor analysis to see if the PAPS-10 factor structure replicated
here. Hypothesis 2 and 3 were tested with a series of Pearson correlation coefficients to estimate
the relationship of the PAPS-10 to all the other included measures. Hypothesis 4 was also
assessed with a Pearson correlation to estimate the degree of temporal stability between
Timepoint 1 and Timepoint 2 PAPS-10 scores.
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the factor structure of the PAPS-10 would be replicated. The
confirmatory factor analysis provided strong evidence in support of this hypothesis, as the
entirety of the PAPS-10 factor structure observed in Studies 1 and 2 were replicated here. This
finding indicates that the factor structure of the PAPS-10 produces a reliable depiction of peoples
PAP FWB. See table 3.2 on 112 for for factor loadings and fit indices.
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Hypotheses 2 and 3 were all about validity. Hypothesis 2 stated that the coefficient
estimates for participant scores of the PAPS-10 to participant scores of all other measures
assessed in this proposed study (e.g., LOC, self-control, mindset, rumination) would show
satisfactory levels of discriminant validity (i.e., ≤ .45). The correlations in table 3.3 on page 113
show that each of the association in question are below the threshold of redundancy/ conceptual
indistinctiveness. Hypothesis 3 stated that people’s agreement with the definition of PAP would
be strongly and positively predicted by their PAPS-10 scores. The results of this study supported
this hypothesis; the greater one’s PAPS-10 score, the more like they were to agree with the PAP
definition of free will (r = .82-.80, p < .05). This predictive ability of the PAPS-10 is afforded
even greater meaning when considering the measure’s predictive ability of the volition definition
of free will—a strong but comparatively weaker predictor of participant agreement with volition
free will (r =.55-.53, p < .05). due the sizable difference between the PAPS-10 predictive ability
See table 3.4 on page 114 for the criterion validity coefficients.
Lastly, hypothesis 4 predicted that the coefficient estimates for peoples PAPS-10 scores
at Timepoint 1 and Timepoint 2 PAPS-10 scores would be greater than a medium effect size and
thereby show satisfactory test-retest stability. The Pearson correlation supported this hypothesis
(r = .89, p < .05), indicating that the PAPS-10 has a good degree of temporal stability/ test-retest
reliability. This finding suggests that the PAPS-10 can be depended upon to provide a temporally
stable assessment of peoples PAP FWB.
Discussion
The results of this research provide evidence of the PAPS-10 as a valid and reliable
measure of peoples PAP FWB. The single factor structure of the PAPS-10 was well supported,
with all 10 PAP items indicating high loadings (λ = 0.77 – 0.915). This study showed that the
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PAPS-10 is conceptually and empirically distinct from other psychological phenomena that had
the potential to confound the measure (e.g., self-control, mindset, future mindedness, ruminative
tendencies). This study also provided good evidence for the predictive/ criterion validity of the
PAPS-10, as the measure was able to strongly predict people’s agreement with the PAP
definition of free will. Lastly, this study showed that the PAPS-10 enjoys very good temporal
stability/ test-retest reliability. Overall, this study provides valuable knowledge for FWB
research, as researchers can now more accurately measure FWB.
Brief Review: From Study 1 to Study 4
To be properly acquainted to the aims of Study 4, a very brief review of the primary goals
of studies 1-3 will likely prove helpful. Study 1 set out to both add to the evidence base
indicating associations between FWB and well-being, as well as develop a measure of FWB
designed to capture the PAP theme of FWB. Study 1 was successful, evidencing the positive
association among FWB and well-being, as well as providing preliminary evidence for the
usefulness of the PAPS-10. Study 2 set out to replicate Study 1 and did exactly that. Study 3 then
further replicated, validated (assessing discriminant validity), and assessed the reliability
(internal and test-retest) of the PAPS-10 FWB measure.
The focal aims of this four-study dissertation project were to: 1) add to the evidence base
indicating associations between free will belief and well-being; 2) develop a measure of FWB
designed to capture the PAP theme of FWB; 3) provide a substantive theoretical framework for
understanding the free will belief and well-being relation; and 4) experimentally test this newly
developed theoretical framework and investigate the potential casual free will belief to wellbeing relation.
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Focal aims 1 and 2 were accomplished through Study 1 and then replicated by Study 2.
Focal aim 3 was addressed in the introduction (refer to pages 19-24). Specifically, I developed
the purpose-imbuing model of FWB to provide a coherent synthesis of the pertinent
philosophical and scientific work regarding the nomological structure of FWB, meaning in life,
and well-being. After describing the purpose-imbuing model of FWB and its ability to provide a
theoretical and mechanistic explanation of the FWB-SWB relationship, I then posited that the
worldview-conflict model may pose a reasonable explanatory challenge to the purpose-imbuing
model. Importantly, clear predictions of each model were discussed and contrasted with each
other to construct a well-rounded experimental design that was then implemented in Study 4.
Review of the Purpose-imbuing model of FWB and its Predictions
The purpose-imbuing model of FWB claims that the primary intrapersonal function of
FWB is to imbue life with meaning and that the adaptive function of FWB is due to the meaning
afforded by FWB. The model is therefore inherently mediational. Specifically, in its positive
formulation, the model predicts that stronger FWB leads to increased meaning in life and that
increased meaning in life then leads to more adaptive SWB. In its negative formulation, the
model predicts that weaker FWB leads to decreased meaning in life and that decreased meaning
in life then leads to less adaptive SWB.
When applied to the experimental manipulation of FWB and its downstream effects on
SWB, the purpose-imbuing model provides 2 key predictions. First, an anti-FWB manipulation
would result in decreased meaning in life (compared to a control condition) which in turn would
result in decreased SWB (compared to a control condition). Second, a pro-FWB manipulation
would result in increased meaning in life (compared to a control condition) which in turn would
result in increased SWB (compared to a control condition). This is contrasted by the worldview-
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conflict model which would primarily predict that an anti-FWB manipulation would result in
increased negative affect (compared to a control group) which would then result in decreased
SWB (compared to a control group).
The tension between the models is found in their predictions for the anti-FWB
manipulation. Specifically, if the only effect found was the one predicted for the anti-FWB
manipulation, one could reasonably claim that the purpose-imbuing model is an inferior
explanation of the data than the worldview-conflict model. However, if the effect predicted for
the anti-FWB manipulation by the purpose-imbuing model can be shown in the face of
controlling for negative affect (i.e., the mediating variable from the worldview-threat model) that
would provide evidence in favor of the purpose-imbuing model of FWB.
Overview of Study 4
The central aim of Study 4 was to experimentally assess the competing models of FWB
and well-being; that is, the purpose-imbuing model of FWB and SWB vs. the worldview-conflict
model of FWB and SWB. An experimental mediation methodology was used to infer the causal
validity of FWB on SWB and determine the explanatory utility of the purpose-imbuing model of
FWB. To accomplish this, the well validated Velten-like FWB manipulation with three
conditions (pro-FWB, anti-FWB, and neutral control; Alquist et al., 2014; Buttrick, 2016; Vohs
& Schooler, 2008) was used and then meaning in life, negative affect, and indicators of wellbeing were assessed. Using a 3 X Continuous between-groups design, I hypothesized:
H1: People in the pro-FWB group will report higher FWB than people in the control
group; serving as evidence of an effective pro-FWB manipulation.
H2: People in the anti-FWB group will report lower FWB than people in the control
group; serving as evidence of an effective anti-FWB manipulation.
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H3: People in the pro-FWB group will report higher meaning in life than people in the
control group.
H4: People in the anti-FWB group will report lower meaning in life than people in the
control group.
H5: People in the pro-FWB group will report more adaptive SWB than people in the
control group.
H6: People in the anti-FWB group will report less adaptive SWB than people in the
control group.
H7: The effect predicted for the pro-FWB group’s SWB will be mediated by meaning in
life. Specifically, people in the pro-FWB group will report more adaptive SWB
(compared to the control group) due to the pro-FWB manipulation bolstering their
perceived meaning in life (compared to the control group). Such a result would
provide evidence in support of the purpose-imbuing model.
H8: The effect predicted for the anti-FWB group’s SWB will be mediated by meaning in
life. Specifically, people in the anti-FWB group will report less adaptive SWB
(compared to the control group) due to the anti-FWB manipulation diminishing their
perceived meaning in life (compared to the control group). Such a result would
provide evidence in support of the purpose-imbuing model.
H9: The mediation effect for the pro-FWB group will remain after accounting for
negative affect; providing evidence for the explanatory superiority of the purposeimbuing model over that of the worldview-conflict model.
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H10: The mediation effect for the anti-FWB group will remain after accounting for
negative affect; providing evidence for the explanatory superiority of the purposeimbuing model over that of the worldview-conflict model.
Method
Participants
A nationally representative sample of United States citizens, of at least 18 years of age,
was collected for this study. Like the previous study, participants were recruited from Prolific
(https://prolific.co/) and compensated $6 for their time.
Materials and Procedure
This study was an online-based experiment using a 3 (i.e., pro-FWB vs. anti-FWB, vs.
control) X Continuous (i.e., meaning in life) between-groups design. The survey was
implemented through Qualtrics and disseminated by Prolific. After reading a short description of
the study, people opting to become participants were directed to an informed consent process and
then routed to the study’s survey in Qualtrics. From the perspective of participants, the study felt
much like a simple survey directing them through a collection of questionnaires. However, the
branching functions of Qualtrics were used to randomly assign participants to one of three FWB
manipulation conditions (i.e., pro-FWB vs. anti-FWB vs. control), resulting in an experimental
online survey methodology. The FWB manipulation procedure was an online version of the same
Velten-like technique used and validated in previous research (e.g., Alquist et al., 2014; Buttrick,
2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). This manipulation procedure has been used in online research
many times and results in effect sizes (for differences in FWB) that are equivalent to those
optioned by the in-person laboratory-based version of the manipulation (Genschow et al., 2021).
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In each condition, participants were asked to read, reflect upon, and then rephrase, 10
statements that comport to the FWB manipulation of relevance. The statements either affirmed,
refuted, or had nothing to do with the concept of free will (pro-FWB, anti-FWB, and control
conditions; respectively). Participants were presented each statement for 30 seconds. After that
time, a text entry box appeared for the participants to rephrase the statements in their own words.
Items exemplifying the pro-FWB condition are: “the most current knowledge from
physics supports indeterminacy is a core property of reality, making human free will entirely
plausible.” And “The first-person experience of free will is just as self-evident as the experience
of water’s wetness.” Items exemplifying the anti-FWB condition are: “Ultimately, we are
biological computers—designed by evolution, built through genetics, and programmed by the
environment.” And “A belief in free will contradicts the known fact that the universe is governed
by lawful principles of science. Items exemplifying the control condition are: “Monarch
butterflies fly slowly but have been sighted hundreds of miles at sea.” And “Most appliances are
guaranteed for a full year against defects.”
After experiencing one of the three FWB manipulations, participants then completed a
manipulation check, as well as a series of measures aimed at assessing meaning in life, negative
affect, and indicators of well-being. Lastly, participants reported demographic characteristics.
Upon completion of the study, each participant was paid $6 as compensation for their time.
Measures
Free Will Beliefs: Manipulation Check
Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD-Plus). Four items from the free will subscale
from the Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD-Plus; Paulhus & Carey, 2011) were used to

76

measure the volition FWB factor and serve as a manipulation check. This measure was used here
in the exact same way that it was in the previous three studies.
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities Scale (PAPS-10). The new PAPS-10 measure
was used to measure the PAP FWB factor and to also serve as another manipulation check. This
measure was used here in the exact same way that it was in the previous three studies.
Subjective Well-Being
Life Satisfaction. The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985; Pavot, &
Diener, 2008), was used as a positive indicator of eudainomic well-being. Participants will
respond to this measure with a 6-point Likert-type scaling (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly
agree). This measure was used here in the exact same way that it was in Studies 1 and 2.
Perceived Quality of Life. The Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (Cantril, 1965) was
used to assess participant perceptions of their quality of life, serving as a positive indicator of
hedonic well-being. This single item measure asks participants to imagine a ladder with 10 steps
for which the bottom step represents “the worst possible life for you” and the top step represents
“the best possible life for you.” Participants are then asked, “on which step of the ladder would
you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” Participants then indicate their perceived
quality of life on a 10-point scale (1 = Worst possible life, 10 = Best possible life).
Perceived State of Well-Being. Four items from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI,
Spielberger et al, 1974) was used to assess participant perceptions of their subjective hedonic
well-being. As most of the items from this measure possess significant conceptual overlap with
the PANAS, only four items that were free of such conceptual overlap (tapping state perceptions
of well-being) were used. These items were: “I feel secure”, “I feel satisfied”, “I feel self-
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confident”, and “I feel content”. Participants will rate the degree to which they agree to these
items using a 6-point Likert-type format.
Meaning in Life
The Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ, Steger, 2006) was used to assess the degree to
which participants feel their lives are significant and purposeful. This 10-item measure assesses
two distinct dimensions of meaning, those of presence of meaning, and the search for meaning.
In this study, participants will record their responses on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 =
Absolutely True, 6 = Absolutely Untrue). Items for the MLQ are exemplified by the following:
“I understand my life’s meaning,” and “My life has a clear sense of purpose.”
Current Affective State
The negative affect items of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark,
& Tellegen, 1988) were used to assess participant’s in vivo negative affect. For this 10-item
measure, participants are presented single words (e.g., irritable, upset) and then asked to rate the
degree to which they are currently experiencing said affective state on a 6-point Likert-type scale
(1 = Very slightly or Not at all, 6 = Extremely).
Perceived Personal Control
The brief measure of Locus of Control (Lumpkin, 1988) will be used to assess
participants levels of perceived personal control over their lives. This will be included to add
further the documentation of the conceptual and empirical distinction between FWB and LOC
constructs. This measure was used here in the exact same way that it was in the previous three
studies.
Data Analytic Approach
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The original data analytic plan for this section of my dissertation project was proposed to
be an assessment of structural invariance by way of SEM. The primary reasoning for this
analytic approach was the advantage of the SEM framework when it comes to measuring a
construct with several factors serving as indicators of said construct. In my case, I thought that
the presence three well-being measures (i.e., SWLS, Cantril ladder, STAI) in my model would
be best served within an SEM framework. However, the measurement model did not yield good
fit because the three well-being measures did not converge into a single well-being factor (all λ <
.3).
As a result of this feature of my data, I chose to proceed with the general linear model
and conduct a mediation model with the experimental manipulation groups serving as a multicategorical predictor using ordinary least squares regression. The coding scheme for the multicategorical FWB manipulation variable was 0 = Control Group, 1 = Anti-FWB Group, 2 = ProFWB Group. I used this dummy coding scheme for ease of interpretation, as the general linear
model inherently uses 0 for a reference category (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Hayes,
2018). This results in the other groups being compared to the reference group only, which in this
case is the control group (i.e., no FWB manipulation). Also, within ordinary least squares
regression with a multi-categorical variable wherein 0 is the reference group dummy code, the
sign of coefficients conveys the difference of a comparison group to the reference group (Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Hayes, 2018). As a result of this feature of the general linear
model, a negative coefficient indicates that the comparison group has a lower mean than the
reference group on the outcome variable (be it a mediator variable or a dependent variable).
Conversely, a positive coefficient indicates that the comparison group has a higher mean on the
outcome variable than the reference group.
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For the hypotheses I am testing with this data, the functions of the general linear model
just discussed dictate that negative coefficients should be seen for the Anti-FWB group vs.
Control group comparisons and positive coefficients for the Pro-FWB group vs. Control group
comparisons. Such findings would indicate that the Anti-FWB group reported less meaning in
life and/or less well-being than the Control group and that the Pro-FWB group reported greater
meaning in life and/or less well-being than the Control group.
The data was checked for meeting the assumptions of the general linear model and was
found to be satisfactorily normal (skewness = .96-1.23; kurtosis = 1.4-1.6). Participant responses
were checked for inattentiveness and 3 were removed due to failing the attention check items,
resulting in a final sample size of 612.
Results
The manipulation checks were assessed with two One-Way ANOVAs. The experimental
conditions produced significant differences within the FAD measure [F(2, 609) = 32, p < .001],
as well as the PAPS-10 measure [F(2, 609) = 927, p < .001]. The anti-FWB group (M FAD
=2.57, M PAPS = 4.10) reported significantly lower FWB than the control group (M FAD =3.11,
M PAPS = 4.89). Also, the pro-FWB group (M FAD =3.29, M PAPS = 5.58) reported
significantly higher FWB than the control group. These results indicate that the FWB
manipulation procedures in this study were effective in changing participant FWB.
Pearson correlations with all primary variables were computed to see if all three
indicators of well-being should be assessed as outcomes in a condition mediation model. The
correlation matrix indicated significant relations between the experimental condition, meaning in
life, eudainomic well-being (assessed with SWLS), as well as one of the indicators of hedonic
well-being (i.e., perceived quality of life assessed with the Cantril ladder. However, no relations
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of interest were observed for the second hedonic well-being measure that assessed state anxiety.
As a result, only satisfaction with life and quality of life (eudainomic and hedonic well-being,
respectively) were estimated with mediation models with the FWB manipulation conditions
serving as a multi-categorical predictor. See table 4.2 on page 116 for all coefficients.
Conditional Mediation Model for Eudainomic Well-Being
A mediation model was constructed in Jamovi 2.3.13 to see if the experimental FWB
groups differed in their levels of satisfaction with life and if this difference was mediated by their
levels of meaning in life. The overall model was significant. Group differences in meaning in life
and satisfaction with life were found for the experimental FWB conditions in the directions
predicted. Compared to the control group, the anti-FWB group reported significantly less
meaning in life and satisfaction with life. Moreover, the effect for the anti-FWB manipulation on
satisfaction with life was also mediated by the effect of the anti-FWB manipulation on meaning
in life. Specifically, and as predicted, the anti-FWB manipulation produced decreased
satisfaction with life and this decrease was mediated through the mechanism of meaning in life;
such that disbelief in free will produced decreased meaning and in turn decreased satisfaction.
Compared to the control group, the pro-FWB group reported significantly greater
meaning in life and satisfaction with life. Also, the effect for the pro-FWB manipulation on
satisfaction with life was also mediated by the effect of the manipulation on meaning in life.
Specifically, and as predicted, the pro-FWB manipulation produced increased satisfaction with
life and this increase was mediated through the mechanism of meaning in life; such that
bolstered belief in free will produced increased meaning and in turn increased satisfaction. See
Table 4.3 on page 117 for coefficients and Figure 4.1 on page 100 for a depiction.
Conditional Mediation Model for Hedonic Well-Being
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Another mediation model was constructed in Jamovi 2.3.13 to see if the experimental
FWB groups differed in their levels of perceived quality of life and if that difference was
mediated by their levels of meaning in life. Once again, the conditional mediation model was
significant. Group differences in meaning in life and perceived quality of life were found for the
experimental FWB conditions, and in the directions that were predicted. Compared to the control
group, the anti-FWB group reported significantly less meaning in life and perceived quality of
life. Moreover, the effect for the anti-FWB manipulation on participants perceived quality of life
was also mediated by the manipulations negative effect on meaning in life. Specifically, and as
predicted, the anti-FWB manipulation produced decreased perceived quality of life and this
decrease was mediated through the mechanism of meaning in life; such that disbelief in free will
produced decreased meaning and in turn decreased quality.
Compared to the control group, the pro-FWB group reported significantly greater
meaning in life and perceived quality in life. Also, the effect for the pro-FWB manipulation on
perceived quality of life was also mediated by the manipulation’s effect on meaning in life.
Specifically, and as predicted, the pro-FWB manipulation produced increased perceived quality
of life and this increase was mediated through the mechanism of meaning in life; such that
bolstered belief in free will produced increased meaning and in turn increased perceived quality.
See Table 4.4 on page 118 for coefficients and Figure 4.2 on page 101 for a depiction.
Discussion
The results of Study 4 supported the stated hypotheses. First, the FWB manipulations
were effective at altering the participants FWB and, importantly, the PAPS-10 served to be a
good check of this manipulation. This result serves to simultaneously bolster both the confidence
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in the Velten-like procedure for manipulating FWB and the validity of the PAPS-10 as a measure
of the FWB factor known as PAP.
Most importantly, this research provides experimental evidence suggesting that belief in
free will results in both increased eudainomic well-being, as well as increased hedonic wellbeing. By manipulating FWB, this study reveals that undermining peoples FWB results in
decreased meaning in life and decreased life satisfaction (i.e., eudainomic well-being), and
bolstering peoples FWB results in increased meaning and therefore increased satisfaction with
life (i.e., eudainomic well-being). Moreover, in addition to the important direct effects observed
by this research, this work also provides good evidence that one of the primary mechanisms for
the causal FWB to well-being relationships is that of meaning in life. This research has shown
that the causal connection between FWB and both eudainomic and hedonic well-being is in no
small part due to the strong connection between FWB and meaning in life. This data suggests
that the meaningful life is a life of quality and satisfaction. Furthermore, theorists for at least a
century have also postulated that, just as the meaningful life is a satisfied one, so too is a free life
a meaningful one. This research validates those theorists and provides evidence that this
connection may well be real, as well as casual.
However, this research while, in my view notable, must be taken with the standard
amount of scientific skepticism. Although this work, primarily that of Study 4, should be
replicated, it also has great potential for generating further hypotheses and increasing knowledge
of both FWB and well-being. One important note was the success of the purpose-imbuing model
of FWB on well-being over that of the worldview-conflict model. Now, neither model
necessitates the exclusion of the other, and both may be functioning in tandem or in interaction
with one another. However, this research does show that the purpose-imbuing model does
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explain a respectable degree of the FWB to well-being causal connection. Furthermore, the
purpose-imbuing model was robust, remaining intact even when controlling for people’s
negative affect—the primary mechanism of the worldview-conflict model. While this finding
does not serve to invalidate the world-view conflict model of FWB on well-being, it does serve
to invalidate the thought that emotion and inner conflict is the only or even primary variable of
importance. In my view, this research demonstrates the importance and potential robustness of
the purpose-imbuing function of FWB.
General Discussion
The focal aims of this four-study dissertation project were to: 1) add to the evidence base
indicating associations between free will belief and well-being; 2) develop a measure of FWB
designed to capture the PAP theme of FWB; 3) provide a substantive theoretical framework for
understanding the free will belief and well-being relation; and 4) experimentally test this newly
developed theoretical framework and investigate the potential casual free will belief to wellbeing relation.
Focal aims 1 and 2 were accomplished through Study 1 and then replicated by Study 2.
Studies 1 and 2 set out to both add to the evidence base indicating associations between FWB
and well-being, as well as develop a measure of FWB designed to capture the PAP theme of
FWB. Study 1 was successful, evidencing the positive association among FWB and well-being,
as well as providing preliminary evidence for the usefulness of the PAPS-10. Study 3 then
further replicated, validated (assessing criterion validity and discriminant validity), and assessed
the reliability (internal and test-retest) of the PAPS-10 FWB measure.
Focal aims 3 and four were accomplished with Study 4. The purpose-imbuing model of
FWB posits that the primary intrapersonal function of FWB is to imbue life with meaning and
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that the adaptive function of FWB is due to the meaning afforded by FWB. I tested this theory in
Study 4 and it was found credible. However, this work needs to be replicated and extended.
Future work should investigate two general questions. First, to what extent, if any, would
differences in people’s baseline FWB moderate the overall phenomenon I captured in Study 4.
Might free will disbelievers versus free will believers show differing patters regarding the
purpose-imbuing vs. worldview-conflict model of FWB on well-being? Second, how might the
purpose-imbuing model be scrutinized within a within-persons framework? What effect, if any,
might volatility in one’s FWB (or other worldview level beliefs for that matter) have on one’s
well-being? Might more, as opposed to less volatility (i.e., relatively sizeable fluctuations over
relatively short time spans) negatively affect well-being (cf. research on self-esteem stability;
Kernis et al., 1991)?
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Appendix A: Figures

Figure 1. Depiction of the Purpose-Imbuing Model of Free Will Belief

Figure 1.2. Depiction of the Worldview-Conflict Model of Free Will Belief
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Figure 1.3. Contrasting Evidence for the Purpose-Imbuing vs. Worldview-Conflict Models
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Figure 1.4.
Measurement Model 1: FWB and Subjective Well-Being.

Free Will
Beliefs

Subjective
Well-Being

Note. Values are standardized ꞵ weights. Unstandardized b weights reported in
text. Model fit statistic were: RMSEA = .104, indicating poor fit. RMR = .046,
indicating good fit. NFI = .963, IFI = .966, CFI = .966, GFI = .974, all indicating
good fit. AGFI = .923, indicating adequate fit. AIC = 109.545 and should be
compared to the AIC value of measurement model 2. For this model, ꭓ2(7)= 81.55,
p < .001.
Appendix B: Tables
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Figure 1.5
Measurement Model 2: FWB and Subjective Well-Being.

Free Will
Beliefs

Subjective
Well-Being

Note. Error terms for anxiety and depression are correlated. Values are
standardized ꞵ weights. Unstandardized b weights reported in text. Model fit
statistic were: RMSEA = .025, indicating good fit. RMR = .007, indicating good
fit. NFI = .996, IFI = .998, CFI = .996, GFI = .997, and AGFI = .989, all indicating
good fit. AIC = 39.697 and is smaller than in measurement model 1, indicating
better fit. For this model, ꭓ2(6)= 9.70, p = .138.
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Figure 1.6.
Structural Model: FWB and Subjective Well-Being.

Free Will
Beliefs

Subjective
Well-Being

Note. Error terms for anxiety and depression are correlated. Values are standardized ꞵ weights. Unstandardized b
weights reported in text. Model fit statistics were: RMSEA = .025, indicating good fit. NFI = .996, IFI = .998, CFI
= .998, indicating good fit. AIC = 51.70. For this model, ꭓ2(6)= 9.70, p = .138.
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Figure 2.1.
Measurement Model 1: FWB and Subjective Well-Being.

Free Will
Beliefs

Subjective
Well-Being

Note. Values are standardized ꞵ weights. Unstandardized b weights reported in
text. Model fit statistic were: RMSEA = .065, indicating satisfactory fit; RMR =
.033, indicating good fit; NFI = .982, IFI = .986, CFI = .986, GFI = .987, AGFI =
.962, indicating good fit; AIC = 57.64 and should be compared to the AIC value
of measurement model 2. For this model, ꭓ2(7)= 29.65, p < .001.
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Figure 2.2.
Measurement Model 2: FWB and Subjective Well-Being.

Free Will
Beliefs

Subjective
Well-Being

Note. Error terms for anxiety and depression are correlated. All values are
standardized ꞵ weights. The unstandardized b weights reported in the text.
Model fit statistics were: RMSEA = .000, indicating great fit; RMR = .007,
indicating great fit; NFI = .997, IFI = .1.00, CFI = 1.00, GFI = .998, AGFI =
.992, indicating great fit; AIC = 35.27, and is smaller than that of the first
measurement model, indicating better fit. For this model, ꭓ2(6)= 5.27, p = .510.
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Figure 3.
Structural Model: FWB and Subjective Well-Being.

Free Will
Beliefs

Subjective
Well-Being

Note. Error terms for anxiety and depression are correlated. All values are standardized ꞵ weights. The
unstandardized b weights reported in the text. Model fit statistics were: RMSEA = .000, indicating great fit;
NFI = .997, IFI = .1.00, CFI = 1.00, indicating great fit. For this model, ꭓ2(6)= 5.27, p = .510.
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Figure 4.1. Mediation Model for Eudainomic Well-Being
ab: b = -.75
Meaning
In Life
a: b = -.84

Anti-FWB Group
Verses
Control Group

b: b = .89

c: b = -1.1

Satisfaction
With Life

c’: b = -.35

ab: b = .63
Meaning
In Life
a: b = .71

Pro-FWB Group
Verses
Control Group

b: b = .89

c: b = .86

Satisfaction
With Life

c’: b = .24

Note. All path coefficients above are p < .001. All paths remained significant after
controlling for state emotion.
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Figure 4.2. Mediation Model for Hedonic Well-Being
ab: b = -.12
Meaning
In Life
a: b = -.84

Anti-FWB Group
Verses
Control Group

b: b = .14

c: b = -.39

Quality
of Life

c’: b = -.27

ab: b = .10
Meaning
In Life
a: b = .71

Pro-FWB Group
Verses
Control Group

b: b = .14

c: b = .36

Quality
of Life

c’: b = .26

Note. All path coefficients above are p < .001. All paths remained significant after
controlling for state emotion.
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Appendix B: Tables

Table 1.1 Full PAP Item Pool
Item Identifier
PAP_1
PAP_2
PAP_3
PAP_4
PAP_5
PAP_6
PAP_7
PAP_8
PAP_9
PAP_10
PAP_11
PAP_12
PAP_13
PAP_14
PAP_15
PAP_16
PAP_17
PAP_18
PAP_19
PAP_20
PAP_21
PAP_22
PAP_23
*PAP_24
*PAP_25
*PAP_26
*PAP_27

People could have made different decisions than the ones they actually made.
People’s past behavior could have been different.
People could have chosen a different path that would have led to a different present.
The past is set in stone but those who built it could have done differently.
Just because a person did a certain action does not mean that they had to do it.
People could have done things in the past that would have allowed them more control in the present.
People can limit the influence of the past.
People can choose to make a real difference because the future is not set in stone.
There are many possible futures that people can make real through free will.
There are different futures that people can bring about through free choice.
What happens in the future will happen because people will choose to make it happen.
People can choose to guide their future toward a goal.
People can co-create the future through their free choice.
People can freely choose how they respond to situations.
People can choose to act one way or another way.
People could always decide to refrain from a given action.
Even if people cannot choose to want what they want, they can still choose how they will act.
Free will and free choice are the same thing.
Free will is based upon the ability to choose one path over another.
People can choose to say no to their own wants and desires.
People can choose to deny themselves the things they want.
Self-control is based on free will.
Just because someone will do a certain thing does not mean that they must do it.
The “ability to have done otherwise” is needed for responsibility.
A person can only be held accountable for an action if they were “able to do otherwise.”
Human responsibility requires free choice.
Every person can do good or bad—it's simply up to them.

Note. *Dropped due to expert review.
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Table 1.2. Factor Loadings for Single PAP Factor Solution
Identifier

Item

Factor 1

Communalities

PAP_1

People could have made different decisions than the
ones they actually made.

.698

.488

PAP_2

People’s past behavior could have been different.

.617

.380

PAP_3

People could have chosen a different path that would
have led to a different present.

.639

.409

PAP_4

The past is set in stone but those who built it could
have done differently.

.412

.170

PAP_5

Just because a person did a certain action does not
mean that they had to do it.

.615

.378

PAP_6

People could have done things in the past that would
have allowed them more control in the present.

.540

.291

PAP_7

People can limit the influence of the past.

.383

.146

PAP_8

People can choose to make a real difference because
the future is not set in stone.

.658

.433

PAP_9

There are many possible futures that people can
make real through free will.

.668

.446

PAP_10

There are different futures that people can bring
about through free choice.

.709

.503

PAP_11

What happens in the future will happen because
people will choose to make it happen.

.532

.283

PAP_12

People can choose to guide their future toward a
goal.

.666

.444

PAP_13

People can co-create the future through their free
choice.

.598

.358

PAP_14

People can freely choose how they respond to
situations.

.568

.322

PAP_15

People can choose to act one way or another way.

.656

.430

PAP_16

People could always decide to refrain from a given
action.

.586

.343

PAP_17

Even if people cannot choose to want what they
want, they can still choose how they will act.

.629

.398

PAP_18

Free will and free choice are the same thing.

.211

.044

PAP_19

Free will is based upon the ability to choose one path
over another.

.560

.314
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PAP_20

People can choose to say no to their own wants and
desires.

.634

.403

PAP_21

People can choose to deny themselves the things
they want.

.596

.355

PAP_22

Self-control is based on free will.

.439

.193

PAP_23

Just because someone will do a certain thing does
not mean that they must do it.

.683

.466

Note. Extraction method was Maximum Likelihood. Items were retained if loadings and
communalities were ≥ .55 and ≥ .4; respectively. Bold values indicate satisfactory loadings.
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Table 1.3. EFA Results for Preliminary 10-Item PAP Scale (PAPS-10)
Identifier

Item

Factor 1

Communalities

PAP_1

People could have made different decisions than
the ones they actually made.

.702

.492

PAP_3

People could have chosen a different path that
would have led to a different present.

.637

.406

PAP_8

People can choose to make a real difference
because the future is not set in stone.

.693

.481

PAP_9

There are many possible futures that people can
make real through free will.

.651

.424

PAP_10

There are different futures that people can bring
about through free choice.

.711

.506

PAP_12

People can choose to guide their future toward a
goal.

.694

.482

PAP_15

People can choose to act one way or another
way.

.640

.41

PAP_17

Even if people cannot choose to want what they
want, they can still choose how they will act.

.645

.416

PAP_20

People can choose to say no to their own wants
and desires.

.615

.380

PAP_23

Just because someone will do a certain thing
does not mean that they must do it.

.682

.465

Note. Extraction method was Maximum Likelihood with promax rotation.
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Table 1.4 Factor Loadings of all FWB Items
Factor
1

2

FAD_1

0.46

FAD_2

0.51

3

FAD_3
FAD_4

0.65

FAD_5

0.60

FAD_6

0.74

FAD_7
PAP_1

0.71

PAP_3

0.65

PAP_8

0.76

PAP_9

0.55

PAP_10

0.65

PAP_12

0.68

PAP_15

0.56

PAP_17

0.70

PAP_20

0.57

PAP_23

0.69
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Table 1.5. Descriptives and Correlations Among Variables

PAPS-10
FAD-Plus FW
LOCI
SWLS
GAD-7
PHQ-9
Skewness
Kurtosis
** p < .01, * p < .05.

PAPS-10
M = 4.85
SD = .65
.568**
.409**
.148**
-.039
-.073*

FAD-Plus FW
M = 4.39
SD = .72

LOCI
M = 4.64
SD = .69

SWLS
M = 3.96
SD = .99

GAD-7
M = 2.73
SD = .74

PHQ-9
M = 2.54
SD = .69

.494**
.206**
-.057
-.090**

.291**
-.065*
-.144**

-.375**
-.480**

.831**

-

-.55
.83

-.15
.04

-.51
1.22

-.35
.06

-.15
-.76

.02
-.63
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Table 2.1. Descriptives and Correlations Among Variables.

PAPS-10
FAD-Plus FW
LOCI
SWLS
GAD-7
PHQ-9
Skewness
Kurtosis

PAPS-10
M = 4.86
SD = .63
.609**
.464**
.130**
-.088*
-.104**

FAD-Plus FW
M = 4.38
SD = .77

LOCI
M = 4.69
SD = .70

SWLS
M = 3.91
SD = 1.02

GAD-7
M = 2.76
SD = .69

PHQ-9
M = 2.57
SD = .65

.486**
.186**
-.134**
-.154**

.234**
-.124**
-.180**

-.375**
-.470**

.810**

-

-1.07
4.53

-.35
.40

-.65
1.92

-.37
-.26

-.20
-.58

-.03
-.53

Note. ** p < 0.01, * p < .07.
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Table 2.2. EFA replication of the 10-Item PAP Scale.
Identifier

Item

Factor 1

Communalities

PAP_1

People could have made different decisions than
the ones they actually made.

.569

.324

PAP_3

People could have chosen a different path that
would have led to a different present.

.648

.420

PAP_8

People can choose to make a real difference
because the future is not set in stone.

.600

.360

PAP_9

There are many possible futures that people can
make real through free will.

.578

.334

PAP_10

There are different futures that people can bring
about through free choice.

.625

.391

PAP_12

People can choose to guide their future toward a
goal.

.682

.465

PAP_15

People can choose to act one way or another
way.

.664

.441

PAP_17

Even if people cannot choose to want what they
want, they can still choose how they will act.

.658

.433

PAP_20

People can choose to say no to their own wants
and desires.

.651

.423

PAP_23

Just because someone will do a certain thing
does not mean that they must do it.

.601

.361

Note. Extraction method was Maximum Likelihood. Items were retained if Factor loadings ≥ .50
and communalities ≥ .30.
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Table 2.3 Factor Loadings of all FWB Items
Factor
1

2

FAD_1

0.65

FAD_2

0.54

FAD_3

3

0.49

FAD_4

0.64

FAD_5

0.45

FAD_6

0.69

FAD_7
PAP_1

0.64

PAP_3

0.49

PAP_8

0.49

PAP_9

0.70

PAP_10

0.59

PAP_12

0.44

PAP_15

0.44

PAP_17

0.50

PAP_20

0.72

PAP_23

0.62
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Table 3.1. Demographic Characteristics

White
Black
Latinx
Asian
Other

Men
51%
29%
7%
10%
4%
3%

Women
49%
27%
6%
9%
2%
3%
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Table 3.2 PAPS-10 Factor Loadings
Item
PAP_1
PAP_2
PAP_3
PAP_4
PAP_5
PAP_6
PAP_7
PAP_8
PAP_9
PAP_10

λ
0.888
0.893
0.807
0.805
0.915
0.915
0.907
0.907
0.77
0.835

Note. RMSEA = .982, indicating good
model fit. CFI = .91, indicating adequate fit.
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Table 3.3 Descriptives and Correlations Among Primary Variables

α
ω
M(SD)

PAPS-10

SelfMastery

SelfControl

Past
Negative

Past
Positive

Future

Rumination

Mindset

FAD

.95

.75

.78

.74

.77

.82

.83

.77

.74

.95

.74

.78

.74

.76

.82

.82

.77

.74

4.58(.89)

4.11(.98)

3.80(.98)

2.32(1.20)

3.33(.83)

3.92(.98)

3.2(.88)

3.85(1.22)

4.45(.93)

PAPS-10
SelfMastery

—
0.07

—

Self-control
Past
Negative

0.33**

0.58***

—

0.17

0.27**

0.03

—

Past Positive

0.27*

0.32**

0.07

0.29***

—

Future

0.13

0.4**

0.01

0.41***

0.67***

—

Rumination

0.43**

0.32**

0.17*

0.52***

0.46***

0.18**

—

Mindset

0.44**

0.25**

0.26*

0.13*

0.17*

0.23**

0.15**

—

FAD

0.68***

0.48***

0.43**

0.03

0.13*

0.24**

0.22**

0.43**

—

LOC

0.47**

0.54***

0.44**

0.09

0.20*

0.34**

0.11**

0.39**

0.55**

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
For LOC: M = 4.66, SD = .93, α = 86, ω = .86
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Table 3.4 PAPS-10 Criterion Validity & Temporal Stability Coefficients
PAPS
Timepoint 1

PAP
Definition

Volition
Definition

PAPS Timepoint
1
PAP Definition

0.82***

Volition
Definition

0.55***

0.62***

PAPS Timepoint
2

0.89***

0.80***

Note. *** p < .001

0.53***

PAPS
Timepoint 2
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Table 4.1. Demographic Characteristics

White
Black
Latinx
Asian
Other

Men
54%
31%
7%
10%
3%
3%

Women
46%
27%
6%
9%
2%
2%
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Table 4.2 Correlations Among All Primary Variables

α
ω
M(SD)

PAPS
MLQ
SWLS
CLAD
SAS
FAD
LOC
.92
.88
.89
NA
.72
.74
.86
.92
.88
.89
NA
.72
.74
.86
4.86(.70) 4.15(.73) 3.89(.90) 3.58(.84) 3.84(.88) 3.67(.94) 4.22(.98)

PAPS_10 —
MLQ
SWLS
CLAD
SAS
FAD
LOC
PANAS

0.64***
0.53***
0.67***
0.20***
0.61***
0.43***
0.31***

—
0.92***
0.56***
0.17***
0.50***
0.47***
0.58***

—
0.57***
0.14***
0.26***
0.48***
0.42***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

—
0.18***
0.16***
0.31***
0.60***

—
0.00
0.05
0.24***

—
0.59**
0.23***

—
0.38**
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Table 4.3 Indirect and Total Effects for Eudainomic Well-Being
Path Type
Indirect

Component

Direct
Total

Effect
Anti-FWB ⇒ Meaning ⇒
Satisfaction
Pro-FWB ⇒ Meaning ⇒
Satisfaction
Anti-FWB ⇒ Meaning
Meaning ⇒ Satisfaction
Pro-FWB ⇒ Meaning
Anti-FWB ⇒ Satisfaction
Pro-FWB ⇒ Satisfaction
Anti-FWB ⇒ Satisfaction
Pro-FWB ⇒ Satisfaction

b

SE

95% C.I.
Lower Upper

β

z

-17.36 < .001

-0.75

0.04

-0.83

-0.66

-0.39

0.63
-0.84
0.89
0.71
-0.35
0.24
-1.1
0.86

0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.04

0.55
-0.91
0.83
0.65
-0.42
0.17
-1.2
0.78

0.7
-0.77
0.95
0.77
-0.28
0.3
-1.01
0.94

0.33
-0.55
0.72
0.46
-0.18
0.12
-0.57
0.45

p

17.19
-23.9
29.13
23.25
-9.67
7.06
-26.7
21.07

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Note. Confidence intervals computed with 5000 parametric bootstrap samples. β = standardized
effect sizes.
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Table 4.3 Indirect and Total Effects for Hedonic Well-Being
Path Type
Indirect

Component

Direct
Total

Effect
Anti-FWB ⇒ Meaning ⇒
Quality
Pro-FWB ⇒ Meaning ⇒
Quality
Anti-FWB ⇒ Meaning
Meaning ⇒ Quality
Pro-FWB ⇒ Meaning
Anti-FWB ⇒ Quality
Pro-FWB ⇒ Quality
Anti-FWB ⇒ Quality
Pro-FWB ⇒ Quality

b

SE

95% C.I.
Lower Upper

β

z

p

-0.12

0.04

-0.19

-0.04

-0.12

-3.06 0.002

0.1

0.03

0.04

0.16

0.1

3.09 0.002

-0.84
0.14
0.71
-0.27
0.26
-0.39
0.36

0.03
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.03

-0.91
0.05
0.65
-0.36
0.17
-0.45
0.3

-0.77
0.23
0.76
-0.18
0.35
-0.32
0.42

-0.55
0.22
0.46
-0.28
0.27
-0.4
0.4

-23.83
3.12
23.85
-5.88
5.6
-11.45
10.59

< .001
0.002
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Note. Confidence intervals computed with 5000 parametric bootstrap samples. β = standardized
effect sizes.
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Appendix C: Studies 1 & 2 Materials
Subjective well-being
The Patient Depression Questionnaire (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2001).
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following problems?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Little interest or pleasure in doing things
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much
Feeling tired or having little energy
Poor appetite or overeating
Feeling bad about yourself — or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family
down
7. Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television
8. Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed? Or the opposite —
being so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual
9. Thoughts that you would be better off dead or of hurting yourself in some way
Response Options:
•
•
•
•

0 = Not at all
1 = Several days
2 = More than half the days
3 = Nearly every day

The Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 2006).
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following problems?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Feeling nervous, anxious, or on edge
Not being able to stop or control worrying
Worrying too much about different things
Trouble relaxing
Being so restless that it is hard to sit still
Becoming easily annoyed or irritable
Feeling afraid, as if something awful might happen

Response Options:
•

0 = Not at all
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•
•
•

1 = Several days
2 = More than half the days
3 = Nearly every day

The Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985; Pavot, & Diener, 2008).
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

In most ways my life is close to my ideal
The conditions of my life are excellent
I am satisfied with my life
So far, I have gotten the important things I want in life
If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing

Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Free Will Belief
Free Will Subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011).
Below are four statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.

People have complete control over the decisions they make
People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to
People have complete free will
Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires

Response Options:
•

1 = Strongly disagree
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•
•
•
•
•

2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Initial Item Pool for Principle of Alternative Possibilities Free Will Belief.
Below is a series of statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

People could have made different decisions than the ones they actually made.
People’s past behavior could have been different.
People could have chosen a different path that would have led to a different present.
The past is set in stone but those who built it could have done differently.
Just because a person did a certain action does not mean that they had to do it.
People could have done things in the past that would have allowed them more control in
the present.
7. People can limit the influence of the past.
8. People can choose to make a real difference because the future is not set in stone.
9. There are many possible futures that people can make real through free will.
10. There are different futures that people can bring about through free choice.
11. What happens in the future will happen because people will choose to make it happen.
12. People can choose to guide their future toward a goal.
13. People can co-create the future through their free choice.
14. People can freely choose how they respond to situations.
15. People can choose to act one way or another way.
16. People could always decide to refrain from a given action.
17. Even if people cannot choose to want what they want, they can still choose how they will
act.
18. Free will and free choice are the same thing.
19. Free will is based upon the ability to choose one path over another.
20. People can choose to say no to their own wants and desires.
21. People can choose to deny themselves the things they want.
22. Self-control is based on free will.
23. Just because someone will do a certain thing does not mean that they must do it.
24. *The ability to have done otherwise is needed for responsibility*
25. *A person can only be held accountable for an action if they were able to do otherwise*
26. *Human responsibility requires free choice*
27. *Every person can do good or bad—it's simply up to them*
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Note. *Dropped due to expert review.
Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Personal Control Beliefs
Internal Subscale of the Brief Locus of Control Scale (Lumpkin, 1988).
Below are three statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work
2. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it
3. My life is determined by my own actions
Response Options:
• 1 = Strongly disagree
• 2 = Disagree
• 3 = Slightly disagree
• 4 = Slightly agree
• 5 = Agree
• 6 = Strongly agree
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Appendix D: Study 3 Materials
Free Will Belief
Free Will Subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011).
Below are four statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.

People have complete control over the decisions they make
People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to
People have complete free will
Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires

Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Principle of Alternative Possibilities Scale.
Below is a series of statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

People could have made different decisions than the ones they actually made.
People could have chosen a different path that would have led to a different present.
People can choose to make a real difference because the future is not set in stone.
There are many possible futures that people can make real through free will.
There are different futures that people can bring about through free choice.
People can choose to guide their future toward a goal.
People can choose to act one way or another way.
Even if people cannot choose to want what they want, they can still choose how they will
act.
9. People can choose to say no to their own wants and desires.
10. Just because someone will do a certain thing does not mean that they must do it.
Response Options:
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•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

PAPS-10 Criterion Validity Assessment
People disagree over how to best define free will. Below are two common definitions of free
will. Please read each definition and then indicate how much you agree with each one.
The alternative possibilities definition: A person has free will, or the capacity for free
action, if they have more than one course of action that stems from the same present
moment. Said differently, A person’s action was free if they were able to do otherwise
(that is, act in a way that was other than they did).
The volition definition: A person has free will, or the capacity for free action, if they are
not externally coerced to make a particular choice and their action was an intentional one
that was based on informed rational deliberation.
Personal Control Beliefs
Internal Subscale of the Brief Locus of Control Scale (Lumpkin, 1988).
Below are three statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work
2. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it
3. My life is determined by my own actions
Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree
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Self-Mastery Scale (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978).
Below are seven statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have (RC)
Sometimes I feel that I’m being pushed around in life (RC)
I have little control over the things that happen to me (RC)
I can do just about anything I really set my mind to
I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life (RC)
What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me
There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life (RC)

Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

The Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004).
Below are thirteen statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1. I am good at resisting temptation
2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits (RC)
3. I am lazy (RC)
4. I say inappropriate things (RC)
5. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun (RC)
6. I refuse things that are bad for me
7. I wish I had more self‐discipline (RC)
8. People would say that I have iron self‐ discipline
9. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done (RC)
10. I have trouble concentrating (RC)
11. I am able to work effectively toward long‐term goals
12. Sometimes I can't stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong (RC)
13. I often act without thinking through all the alternatives (RC)

126

Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Temporal Perspectives and Orientations
Brief Zimbardo Time Perception Inventory (Kostal et al., 2015; Zimbardo & Boyd 1999).
Below are twelve statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.

I often think of what I should have done differently in my life
I think about the good things that I have missed out on in my life
I think about the bad things that have happened to me in the past
Familiar childhood sights, sounds, smells often bring back a flood of wonderful
memories
5. It gives me pleasure to think about my past
6. Happy memories of good times spring readily to mind
7. I often feel that I cannot fulfill my obligations to friends and authorities
8. To think about my future makes me sad
9. Usually, I do not know how I will be able to fulfill my goals in life
10. When I want to achieve something, I set goals and consider specific means for reaching
those goals
11. I complete projects on time by making steady progress
12. I am able to resist temptations when I know that there is work to be done
Past-Negative subscale (items 1-3), Past-Positive subscale (items 4-6)
Future-Negative subscale (items 7-9), Future-Positive subscale (items 10-12)
Response Options:
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
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•
•
•

4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Ruminative Tendencies
The Ruminative Responses Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; NolenHoeksema et al., 1999).
Below is a list of 10 possible responses when people feel down, sad, or depressed. Read each
possibility and indicate if you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each one when you
feel down, sad, or depressed. Please be open and honest in your responding. Whichever answers
you feel best fit you are the best answers for you.
Stem: when feeling down, sad, or depressed, you…
1. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”
2. Think “Why do I always react this way?”
3. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better
4. Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”
5. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?”
6. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed
7. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way
8. Write down what you are thinking and analyze it
9. Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed
10. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings
Brooding rumination subscale (1-5), Reflection rumination subscale (6-10)
Response Options:
•
•
•
•

0 = Never
1 = Sometimes
2 = Often
3 = Always

Mindset
The 3-Item Growth Mindset Scale (Dweck, 1995, 1999, 2006).
Below are twelve statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
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1. You can always change basic things about the kind of person you are
2. No matter what kind of person you are, you can always change substantially
3. The harder you work at something, the better you will be at it
Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Personality
The Big Five Inventory‐10 (BFI‐10, Rammstedt, & John, 2007).
Below are 10 statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate the degree to which you feel each statement describes your personality. Please be open
and honest in your responding. Whichever answers you feel best fit you are the best answers for
you.
Stem: I see myself as someone who…
1. …is reserved (RC)
2. …is generally trusting
3. …tends to be lazy (RC)
4. …is relaxed, handles stress well (RC)
5. …has few artistic interests (RC)
6. …is outgoing, sociable
7. …tends to find fault with others (RC)
8. …does a thorough job
9. …gets nervous easily
10. …has an active imagination
Extraversion subscale: items 1, 5
Agreeableness subscale: items 2, 7
Conscientiousness subscale: items 3, 8
Neuroticism subscale: 4, 9
Openness to Experience subscale: 5, 10
Response Options:
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•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree
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Appendix E: Study 4 Materials
Free Will Belief Manipulation
Instructions
For the first part of this study, you will be completing a measure of written expression.
For each statement given, you will be asked to rephrase the statement in your own
words.
For example, take the sentence, "It rains at five every day in Florida." You could change
the order the information is presented and say: "In Florida, it rains every day at five." You could
substitute one of the words in the sentence and say, "It precipitates at five every day in Florida."
You could leave out some information to simplify the sentence and say, "It rains often in
Florida"
Some of the statements you will be given may be complex and difficult to understand.
Please think carefully about the sentence to make sure that you are accurately capturing the
meaning of the sentence when you re-write it.
Each sentence will be presented for 30 seconds. During that time, please think about
the meaning of the sentence and how it could apply to your life.
Pro-FWB Items
1. I demonstrate my free will every day when I make decisions
2. I take personal pride in good decisions I have made in the past because I know that, at the
time, I had the freedom to and could have made a bad decision.
3. I am able to override the genetic and environmental factors that sometimes influence my
behavior.
4. Avoiding temptation requires that I exert my free will.
5. Ultimately people cannot blame their own actions on anything other than themselves.
6. I have free will to control my actions and ultimately to control my destiny in life.
7. People are responsible for their behaviors because they have free will to control their
actions.
8. Our actions and thoughts are not simply the result of prior experiences.
9. By exerting their free will, people can and do overcome the negative effects of a
dysfunctional environment.
10. Given that I have had personal experiences that science cannot explain, I also know that I
have free will even if science cannot explain it.
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Anti-FWB Items
1. Ultimately, we are biological computers – designed by evolution, built through genetics,
and programmed by the environment.
2. Science has demonstrated that free will is an illusion.
3. Everything a person does is a direct consequence of their environment and genetic
makeup.
4. Once scientists understand enough about the physical principles underlying behavior,
they should be able to precisely predict a person’s future actions based solely on that
person’s genetics and prior experiences.
5. Our actions are determined by what we have experienced in the past combined with the
specific genetic predispositions that we have.
6. Like everything else in the universe, all human actions follow from prior events and
ultimately can be understood in terms of the movements of molecules.
7. A belief in free will contradicts the known fact that the universe is governed by lawful
principles of science.
8. People often claim that they have free will, but all they really have is the experience of
making choices.
9. Just as science has shown that physical movement is merely forces of gravity combined
with muscular force, scientists are now realizing that personal thoughts, feelings, and
beliefs are similarly controlled by basic physical processes.
10. Even if some behaviors are not actually pre-determined, this does not mean there is free
will, as random actions are no more under our control than are those caused by prior
events.
Control Items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Alkaline power cells generally work longer than ordinary batteries
Monarch butterflies fly slowly but have been sighted hundreds of miles at sea.
Half a day’s boat ride away from Athens lies the isle of Mykonos.
Sugar cane and sugar beets are grown in 112 countries.
Many of the mountain peaks in the Rockies are over 14,000 feet high.
The Appalachian Highlands are worn down mountains and plateaus stretching from
northern Alabama to the St. Lawrence River in Canada.
7. The greatest distance the earth is from the sun is 94,452,000 miles.
8. The Nile River in Africa is the world’s largest river.
9. The Los Angeles metropolitan area is known for its complex system of highways.
10. Most appliances are guaranteed for a full year against defects.
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Manipulation Checks of FWB
Free Will Subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011).
Below are four statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.

People have complete control over the decisions they make
People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to
People have complete free will
Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires

Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Principle of Alternative Possibilities Scale.
Below is a series of statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

People could have made different decisions than the ones they actually made.
People could have chosen a different path that would have led to a different present.
People can choose to make a real difference because the future is not set in stone.
There are many possible futures that people can make real through free will.
There are different futures that people can bring about through free choice.
People can choose to guide their future toward a goal.
People can choose to act one way or another way.
Even if people cannot choose to want what they want, they can still choose how they will
act.
9. People can choose to say no to their own wants and desires.
10. Just because someone will do a certain thing does not mean that they must do it.
Response Options:
•

1 = Strongly disagree

133

•
•
•
•
•

2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Subjective Well-Being
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985; Pavot, & Diener, 2008).
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 6 scale below,
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding
that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

In most ways my life is close to my ideal
The conditions of my life are excellent
I am satisfied with my life
So far I have gotten the important things I want in life
If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing

Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Slightly agree
5 = Agree
6 = Strongly agree

Five Items from The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al, 1974).
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Please
read each statement and indicate the degree to which you feel each one right now, that is, at this
very moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I feel secure
I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes (RC)
I feel satisfied
I feel self-confident
I feel content
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Response Options:
1

2

3

4

5

Not
at all

6
Very
much so

The Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (Cantril, 1965).
Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to 10 at the top.
The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder
represents the worst possible life for you.
On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?
1

2

Worst
possible life
for you

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Best
possible life
for you

Mediators/Controls
The Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006; Steger & Shin,
2010).
Please take a moment to think about what makes your life feel important to you. Please indicate
the degree to which you feel each statement is true for you. These are also very subjective
questions, so there are no right or wrong answers.
1. I understand my life’s meaning
2. I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful
3. I am always looking to find my life’s purpose
4. My life has a clear sense of purpose
5. I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful
6. I have discovered a satisfying life purpose
7. I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant
8. I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life
9. My life has no clear purpose (RC)
10. I am searching for meaning in my life
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Presence of meaning subscale: 1, 4, 5, 6, 9
Search for meaning subscale: 2, 3, 7, 8, 10
Response Options:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 = Absolutely Untrue
2 = Mostly Untrue
3 = Somewhat Untrue
4 = Somewhat True
5 = Mostly True
6 = Absolutely True

The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988)
Below is a list of twenty emotionally relevant adjectives. Please indicate the degree to which you
feel each one right now, that is, at this very moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your
present feelings best.
1. Interested
2. Distressed
3. Excited
4. Upset
5. Strong
6. Guilty
7. Scared
8. Hostile
9. Enthusiastic
10. Proud
11. Irritable
12. Alert
13. Ashamed
14. Inspired
15. Nervous
16. Determined
17. Attentive
18. Jittery
19. Active
20. Afraid
Positive affect items: 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19

